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INTRODUCTION
When did our modern debates over corporate governance begin?
The traditional view dates them to 1932 with the publication of Adolf A.
Berle and Gardiner Means’s The Modern Corporation and Private Property, a work that delineated the separation of ownership and control in
the modern corporation and the problems that separation caused.1 The
Modern Corporation is said to be the “ur-text of modern corporate governance,”2 to have “began the modern debate on corporate governance,”3 to have first identified the “fundamental problem in U.S. corporate governance,”4 to be the first work to have “described corporate governance as a problematic separation of ownership and control,”5 and
even, in one contrarian take, to be the work that “got the corporate governance literature off on the wrong foot.”6 Careful students will occasionally acknowledge that there were predecessors to Berle and Means
and that the idea of the separation of ownership and control was in the air
†
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1. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1968) (1932) [hereinafter MODERN CORPORATION].
2. Lawrence Mitchell, The Trouble with Boards 14 (George Washington University Law Sch.
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper, Paper No. 159, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=801308.
3. Liam Seamus O’Melinn, Neither Contract Nor Concession, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 201,
201 (2006).
4. Jesse Fried, Options Backdating and Its Implications, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 853, 884
(2008).
5. William Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1381 (2007).
6. Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Boards of Directors: In Principle and Practice, 24 J.L.
ECON. & ORG, 247, 268 (2009) (“[T]he Berle and Means query . . . got the corporate governance
literature off on the wrong foot.”). Williamson is not the only scholar who thinks Berle and Means
got it wrong. So did most of the contributors to the symposium held on their work’s fiftieth anniversary. See Symposium, Corporations and Private Property: A Conference Sponsored by the Hoover
Institution, 26 J.L. & ECON. 235 (1983).
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before The Modern Corporation and Private Property.7 But the broader
message is clear: whatever came before, corporate governance really
began with Berle and Means.8
This Article will show that this story is wrong. It is wrong not because Berle and Means were not path-breaking and innovative (they
were), nor because they did not develop an enduring framework for corporate legal scholarship (they did). The story is wrong because of what it
leaves out. The Modern Corporation and Private Property was not a
radical break from earlier thought but the end product of several decades
in which economists, lawyers, and journalists tried to understand both the
governance problems of the new modern corporations and what impact
those corporate governance problems had on the nation’s public. The
separation of ownership and control, together with dispersed shareholding, two closely related but not identical concepts, had been identified as
a new development for the American corporation shortly after the turn of
the twentieth century—well before Berle and Means—but those developments’ import was not at all clear. Thus, economists and legal scholars
of that earlier era argued over what exactly was meant by the separation
of ownership and control, what groups it would most sharply impact, and
even whether it was a problem at all.
By the 1920s these ideas took on a more familiar cast, as several
writers identified the separation of ownership and control and widely
dispersed share ownership as developments that raised grave problems
7. See, e.g., Lipartito & Morii, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1025 (2010) (discussing Ripley as a
predecessor to Berle and Means); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836–
1937 357–59 (1991) (discussing Marshall, Veblen, and Ripley) [hereinafter ENTERPRISE]; Herbert
Hovenkamp, Neoclassicism and the Separation of Ownership and Control, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV.
373, 374–75 (2009) [hereinafter Neoclassicism]; Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Shareholders as Proxies: The
Contours of Shareholder Democracy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1503, 1527–33, 1539 (2006) (Ripley) [hereinafter Shareholders as Proxies]. Tsuk Mitchell is the only legal scholar to devote much
attention to Ripley within the last two decades, though a few have focused on specific aspects of his
work. Id. See also Rebecca Roiphe, The Most Dangerous Profession, 39 CONN. L. REV. 603, 646–
48 (2006) (Ripley’s calls for independent auditing); Eric A. Chiappinelli, The Moral Basis of State
Corporate Law Disclosure, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 697, 705–09 (2000) (addressing Ripley’s discussion of state disclosure requirements); Fred S. McChesney, Intellectual Attitudes and Regulatory
Change: An Empirical Investigation of Legal Scholarship in the Depression, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 211,
235–40 (1988) (comparing and measuring reception of Ripley’s and Berle and Means’s works); Joel
Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Rights: The One Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 687, 693–99 (1986) (discussing Ripley and the campaign against nonvoting stock in
the 1920s).
8. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1756 (2004) (“For most of the twentieth century, the
dominant paradigm of corporate governance within legal academia was that provided by Berle and
Means in their classic 1932 book.”); Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance ‘Reform’ and the
New Corporate Social Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605, 605 (2001) (dating “the history of
corporate governance ‘reform’” to Berle and Means).

2010]

The Birth of Corporate Governance

1249

for the management of corporations. These writers also identified shareholder protection as the central goal for corporation law. It was during
this decade that corporate governance became a major topic for public
debate, as newspaper articles, magazine accounts, and popular books
appeared. These publications attacked corporate management, asserted
that management was benefitting itself at shareholders’ expense, and
pointed to the separation of ownership and control as the ultimate culprit.
By seeing Berle and Means’s work as a product and a beneficiary of
these debates, we can better understand the genuine innovations it made
and why it was so quickly accepted as a classic.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly examines the concept of “corporate governance” and argues for dating the concept’s origins to the debates of the 1920s. Part II then moves on to examine early
scholarly and popular discussions of the separation of ownership and
control. After surveying the historical developments that produced the
recognizably modern corporate economy around the turn of the century,
it examines early scholarly and popular discussions of the separation of
ownership and control, focusing on three major thinkers, Louis D. Brandeis, Walter Lippmann, and Thorstein Veblen. It argues that, while each
of these authors examined the separation of ownership and control, they
did not agree on its contours or impact. They did not necessarily see the
separation of ownership and control as a problem for shareholders, and
some did not see it as a problem at all. To portray these authors simply
as anticipators of Berle and Means is to misunderstand the arguments
they actually made and to miss the ways in which ideas about the separation of ownership and control were slowly developed.
Part III, the heart of this Article, focuses on Berle and Means’s
most significant predecessor in the debates over corporate governance,
William Z. Ripley, and his 1920s crusade for better corporate governance, culminating in his book Main Street and Wall Street.9 It discusses
how Ripley, already one of the best-known economists of his day,
launched a campaign in 1925 against financial and legal innovations that
were, he claimed, allowing corporate managers to wrest control of corporations away from their owners—shareholders scattered across the country. In speeches and a series of articles in the Atlantic magazine, Ripley
hammered corporate leaders and pushed for a range of reforms in corporate law and governance intended to provide new protections for shareholders. His campaign drew wide attention and gained notice from Wall
Street and the President of the United States. Ripley was not alone during the 1920s; his work is only the best-remembered of a series of scho9. WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET (1927) [hereinafter MAIN STREET].
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larly and popular works that turned a spotlight on the separation of ownership and control and the spread of shareholding. Thus, it was during
the 1920s that recognizably modern views of the separation of ownership
and control, and its consequences, took form.
Finally, in Part IV, the Article turns to Berle and Means. It discusses both their connections to earlier theorists and crusaders, and the
ways in which they transcended their predecessors. The Modern Corporation and Private Property broke with its predecessors by providing a
technically sophisticated and empirically based legal and economic analysis of the separation of ownership and control, and by setting that analysis within a narrative describing how the modern corporation had come
to dominate American economy and society.
In discussing the history of corporate governance before Berle and
Means, I intend to do three things. First, I seek to develop a new account
of the origins of modern debates over corporate governance. As told
now, the story usually begins with The Modern Corporation and Private
Property, with the economic development of large corporations provided
as background, and perhaps a footnote acknowledging some intellectual
precursors. As an historical account, this story misses or downplays
writers who grappled with the separation of ownership and control before
Berle and Means and who saw that separation in very different lights
than did Berle and Means. It was not inevitable that the problem of
ownership and control would take the form it eventually did, with shareholder protection and managerial power as its main foci; however, we
cannot recognize its contingent nature until we reach back to see alternative paths not taken.
Second, I wish to emphasize an element sometimes overlooked,
then and now, in debates over corporate governance: their popular aspect.10 In the 1920s, corporate governance became a matter of concern
to the general public, one that drew in not only economists or law professors but also ordinary Americans who were introduced to and then angered by the separation of ownership and control.
Third, I hope to shed new light on why The Modern Corporation
and Private Property won such immediate acclaim. Why were Berle and
Means so quickly hailed as prophets? Much of the answer lies in the fact
they built on ideas already in circulation and spoke to a public already
10. Not to say that other scholars have completely missed the public face of corporate governance; some critics of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, for instance, have attributed its flaws to the fact that
it was a product not of careful deliberation but of a hurried response to public outrage. See, e.g.,
Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114
YALE L.J. 1521, 1528 and passim (2005) (connecting the passage of the Act to the economic downturn and public outcry inspired by a “media frenzy involving several high-profile corporate fraud and
insolvency cases”).
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primed to hear their views. This is not to disparage Berle and Means’s
very real accomplishments, which were many; they both synthesized and
transformed what had gone before. But we can best understand their genuine innovations by also understanding the achievements of their predecessors.
The historical aim of this Article, then, is not merely to find out
who said “separation of ownership and control” first, 11 for tracing out an
intellectual antecedent wouldn’t tell us why the idea succeeded. This
Article instead aims to explain why and when the idea took shape, flourished, and spread.
I. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: WHERE TO BEGIN?
Asserting that corporate governance’s origins lie early in the twentieth century, before Berle and Means, raises the question: what do we
mean by corporate governance? In one form or another, “corporate governance” has always been with us, at least as long as the corporate form
has allowed for conflicts between investors and managers. Early in the
seventeenth century, for example, conflicts between directors and shareholders marked the Dutch East India Company.12 In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith identified divergent interest between managers and
owners as an, in his eyes, insuperable dilemma for the efficient operation
of the corporation. Directors, he wrote, “being the managers of other
people’s money rather than their own,” would never watch over this
money with the “same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a
private copartnery frequently watch over their own.” Thus, Smith argued, “[n]egligence and profusion . . . must always prevail . . . in the
management of such a company.”13 In the mid-nineteenth century, corporate governance in the U.S. shifted with changes in shareholder voting
rights as democratic, weighted-voting systems, which gave small shareholders significant power, were replaced by a “plutocratic” system of
one-share, one vote, favoring those with the most shares.14 Each of these
examples was surely an episode in the history of corporate governance.15
11. Herbert Hovenkamp has traced the concept at least to the economist Alfred Marshall and
the legal scholar William W. Cook in the 1890s. HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, supra note 7, at 357–
58.
12. Matthijs de Jongh, Shareholder Activism at the Dutch East India Company, 1622–1625,
(Research Department of the Supreme Court of The Netherlands, Working Paper No., 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1496871.
13. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
606–07 (Penn State Press ed. 2005) (1776).
14. Colleen Dunlavy, From Citizens to Plutocrats: Nineteenth-Century Shareholder Voting
Rights and Theories of the Corporation, in CONSTRUCTING CORPORATE AMERICA: HISTORY,
POLITICS, CULTURE 66, 66–68 (Kenneth Lipartito & David Sicilia eds., 2004).
15. See id. (identifying the essay as a contribution to the history of corporate governance).
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As it is used by corporate law scholars today, however, “corporate
governance” has a more specialized connotation.16 At its broadest, the
term can cover all the rules of and constraints on corporate decisionmaking.17 More often, however, its use is tied to the need to constrain
managers to act in shareholders’ best interests, at least in the public corporation. In other words, corporate governance is a response to the
agency problems created by the separation of ownership and control,
namely the powerless shareholders and the autonomous management.
This is nicely captured in a definition of the term offered by Hillary Sale:
The term “corporate governance” is widely used to refer to the
balance of power between officers, directors, and shareholders.
Academics often discuss it in the context of regulating communications and combating agency costs where corporate officers
and directors have the power to control the company, but the
owners are diverse and largely inactive shareholders. Good corporate governance, then, allows for a balance between what officers and directors do and what shareholders desire. The term
implies that managers have the proper incentives to work on behalf of shareholders and that shareholders are properly informed
about the activities of managers.18

While other scholars have offered variants of this definition, essential to almost all definitions is the need for mechanisms to minimize
problems created by the separation of ownership and control. That is, in
a world of dispersed and “largely inactive” shareholders, corporate governance asks what legal, economic, and social mechanisms can best
compel their agents, the corporation’s managers, not only to run the corporation well but also to run it for the benefit of shareholders and not
themselves.19 As one commentator put it, the separation of ownership
16. The term itself appears to have become popular only in the 1980s and was used to describe
the movement to reform corporate rules and norms to provide greater legal protections to shareholders. See E. Norman Veasey & Christine di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law
and Governance from 1992–2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
1399, 1410–11 (2005); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV.
1259, 1259–60 (1982).
17. See, e.g., Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence
from the Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 516 (2007)
(“‘Corporate governance’ is a broad concept that the legal literature has given a narrow definition.
Scholars discuss it most often in the context of specific regulatory reforms or in terms of charter
provisions and other easily observable structural characteristics on which regressions can be run.
But corporate governance may refer more broadly to any aspect of the system of incentives and
constraints operating within a firm.”).
18. Hillary Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 460 (2004).
19. See, e.g., JONATHAN MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES
BROKEN vii (2008) (discussing corporate governance as “farrago of legal and economic devices that
induce the people in charge of companies with publicly owned and traded stock to keep the promises
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and control is “the central problem of corporate governance.”20 It is to
the separation of ownership and control—how it arose, how it was first
understood, and how it came to be seen as a problem—that we now turn.
II. SEPARATIONS
In the early decades of the twentieth century, observers were united
in recognizing that there were major transformations underway in the
corporate economy, that these changes would also have far-reaching social and political effects, and that the changes included a separation of
ownership from control. They did not, however, agree on what these
changes were or what they meant.
A. Historical Antecedents
The business and economic developments that would give rise to
the modern corporation and to modern corporate governance are well
understood and deserve only a brief recap. The nineteenth century saw
the growth of giant, complex industrial enterprises in several industries,
starting with the railroads.21 At the turn of the twentieth century, largescale business organization came to the manufacturing sector as industrywide mergers attempted to unite many comparatively small firms into
“single giant enterprise[s]” that dominated their respective industries.22
Although not all industrial combinations succeeded, those that did succeeded spectacularly. By the mid-1910s, a few giant “center firms”
dominated many sectors of the American economy and maintained their
preeminence for decades.23 These firms’ growth generated a popular
they make to investors”); Merritt B. Fox & Michael A. Heller, Corporate Governance Lessons from
Russian Enterprise Fiascoes, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1720, 1722 (2000) (“Firms exhibit good corporate
governance when they both maximize the firm’s residuals—the wealth generated by real operations
of the firm—and, in the case of investor-owned firms, distribute the wealth so generated to shareholders in a pro rata fashion.”). Some scholars, it should be noted, argue against a narrow focus
solely on shareholder benefit. See PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence Mitchell ed., 1995).
20. STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 5
(2008).
21. The standard account of the growth of large-scale enterprise in the United States remains
ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN
BUSINESS (1977), which of course gives a far more complex account than the brief summary presented above. It should now be read in conjunction with later critiques. See, e.g., Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Daniel M.G. Raff & Peter Temin, Beyond Markets and Hierarchies: Toward a New Synthesis
of American Business History, 108 AM. HIST. REV. 404, 428–35 (2003).
22. NAOMI LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS, 1895–
1904 1 (1985). Not all the merged firms succeeded, but many did and they dominated their respective industries for much of the twentieth century. See CHANDLER, supra note 21, at 340–44.
23. Center firms succeeded in industries where a capital-intensive, technologically advanced
firm would enjoy significant economies of scale, scope, or both. THOMAS MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF
REGULATION 68–79 (1984) [hereinafter PROPHETS]. Informal or formal attempts at combination
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backlash; critics ranged from farmers baffled and angered by high railroad rates to small retailers pressed by giant competitors. Distinctions
between various kinds of combinations and their various ill effects were
often lost in public discourse, as a generalized hostility to large business
enterprises arose under the misleading heading of the “trust problem.”24
Another development ran alongside the growth of large corporations and the hostility to them: the broadening market for their securities
and a growing number of shareholders.25 When the turn-of-the-century
mergers produced new giant corporations, they also produced many individuals, specifically the former owners of the small firms that combined
in the merger, who needed to be paid for their ownership interests.26
These individuals received securities, preferred and common stock,
which they often sold, giving rise to a market for industrial securities.
For the first time, a significant number of comparatively “small” investors were drawn into securities ownership.27 Although exact ownership
is extremely difficult to estimate before the 1920s, one study showed that
the three largest American corporations at least tripled their number of
book stockholders between 1900 and 1917.28 Further, the popular press
increased its attention given to the phenomenon of stock ownership by

failed in industries that did not have such features and where entry by new competitors was easy.
See id.
24. See MAURY KLEIN, THE GENESIS OF INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 1870–1920 127 (Donald Critchlow ed., 2007) (“By 1890 alarmed critics were plastering the ‘trust’ label on every giant enterprise
and flinging it about as a loose synonym for monopoly and big business in general.”); MCCRAW,
PROPHETS, supra note 23, at 57–79.
25. See generally Julia Cathleen Ott, When Wall Street Met Main Street: The Quest for an
Investors’ Democracy and the Emergence of the Retail Investor in the United States, 1890–1930, 9
ENTER. & SOC’Y 619 (2008) [hereinafter When Wall Street]; LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE
SPECULATION ECONOMY: HOW FINANCE TRIUMPHED OVER INDUSTRY 103–05, 200–04 (2007) [hereinafter SPECULATION ECONOMY].
26. See Thomas R. Navin & Marian V. Sears, The Rise in a Market for Industrial Securities
1887–1902, 29 BUS. HIST. REV. 105, 137 (1955). Although Navin and Sears’s account focuses on
industrial securities, other evidence suggests that railroad securities were also not widely held before
1900. Of the largest U.S. railroads in 1900, only two had more than 10,000 book stockholders, the
Union Pacific (14,256) and the giant Pennsylvania (51,543); the only other large corporations with
more than 10,000 book shareholders were American Sugar (10,816) and U.S. Steel (54,016). Gardiner C. Means, The Diffusion of Stock Ownership in the United States, 44 Q. J. ECON. 561, 594
(1930) [hereinafter Diffusion].
27. Ott, When Wall Street, supra note 25, at 620 (A century ago, “no more than three percent of
households held stocks or bonds.”). This is not to assert that then, or now, most Americans directly
owned securities, just that the numbers that did own stocks or bonds rose sharply by the 1920s.
28. Means, Diffusion, supra note 26. Means’s study is illuminating, but any attempt at obtaining exact estimates is stymied by lack of transparency. His figures show, for example, that the total
number of book shareholders in the nation’s thirty-one largest firms almost tripled from 1900 to
1917, but he cannot tell how much of this ownership is duplicative (e.g., one individual owning
shares in two companies being counted twice) or through intermediaries, nor exactly who these
individuals are.
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comparatively small investors.29 The real explosion in stock ownership,
though, would occur in the 1920s when millions of Americans became
first-time investors.30
It is around 1900 that we first find stirring the popular idea that
ownership and control were separating in the modern corporation. Well
before then, of course, there had been corporations with minority shareholders who were not active in management, 31 and those minority shareholders had at times suffered oppression at the hands of the controlling
shareholders who ran their firms. 32 However, there was not a sense that
these minority shareholders were so numerous or widely dispersed that
they were a class deserving of extra protection, or that their plight should
be a major public issue. Nor was there the sense that some corporations
were coming under the control, not of a dominant shareholder, but of
autonomous managers. What was new after the turn of the century was
the concern about the growing number of small shareholders, who appeared powerless to influence corporate management—even if they
wished to do so—and a realization that followed from this: if ownership
was so diffused that shareholders no longer controlled the corporation
and if management had taken on that task, then the interests of shareholders and managers might no longer be the same. It was these two developments, the growth of small shareholders and the rise of managers
with little ownership in the corporation, that came to be lumped together
as the separation of ownership and control.
The implications of this development were addressed in the early
decades of the twentieth century by three writers who left extraordinary
intellectual legacies: the activist lawyer and later Supreme Court Justice,
Louis D. Brandeis; journalist, Walter Lippmann; and dissident economist, Thorstein Veblen.33 Each has been identified as a discoverer of the
29. See MITCHELL, SPECULATION ECONOMY, supra note 25, at 95–103.
30. Ott, When Wall Street, supra note 25, at 620.
31. One recent study has found that as early as the 1820s, corporations in New York often had
many more shareholders than could have been actively involved in management. The average corporation had seventy-four shareholders, and a few had several hundred. See Eric Hilt, When Did
Ownership Separate from Control? Corporate Governance in the Early Nineteenth Century, 68 J.
ECON. HIST. 645, 663–64 (2008). These corporations were probably not marked by “managerial
control,” but “minority control,” with “managers holding stakes that were large enough to make
them unaccountable to the other shareholders[,] was [likely] quite common.” Id. at 679.
32. On minority shareholders in corporation law during the late nineteenth century, see Naomi
Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Corporate Governance and the Plight of the Minority Shareholders in the United States Before the Great Depression, in CORRUPTION AND REFORM: LESSONS
FROM AMERICA’S ECONOMIC HISTORY 126–29 (Edward Glaeser & Claudia Goldin eds., 2006).
33. Others could be added to the list; in addition to Alfred Marshall and William Cook, see
HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, supra note 7, at 357–59, one could cite the German politician Walter
Rathenau, see BERLE & MEANS, MODERN CORPORATION, supra note 1, at 2 n.3, 352, or Woodrow
Wilson, who described the corporation in a 1910 speech as “an arrangement by which hundreds of
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separation of ownership and control,34 but to write of them solely in this
vein misses the mark. To see them as merely precursors to Berle and
Means overlooks the significant ways in which each differed from Berle
and Means in their understanding of the separation of ownership and
control and its consequences. From today’s vantage point, the separation
of ownership and control appears as a problem in corporate governance
to be solved by mechanisms that would protect shareholders. Brandeis,
Lippmann, and Veblen saw it differently.
B. Brandeis, Lippmann, Veblen
In his 1914 collection Other People’s Money and How the Bankers
Use It, Brandeis honed in on the problem of the separation of ownership
and control. 35 Brandeis, a crusading public interest lawyer at this stage
of his life, may have been alerted to the topic by the report of the Pujo
Committee. This 1913 congressional investigation into the “money
trust” concluded that in almost “all great corporations with numerous and
widely scattered stockholders[,] . . . management is virtually selfperpetuating and is able through the power of patronage, the indifference
of stockholders[,] and other influences to control a majority of stock.”36
It was shortly after receiving the Pujo Committee report that Brandeis
wrote the essays that became Other People’s Money.37
In Other People’s Money, Brandeis noted that the dispersion of
share ownership left the “bonds and stocks of the more important corporations . . . owned, in large part, by small investors, who do not participate in the management of the company.”38 Such small investors were
unable to judge the worth of securities without the help of intermediaries,
and their dependence “upon the banker [had] grown in recent years, since
women and others who [did] not participate in the management, [had]
thousands of men who would in days gone by have set up in business for themselves put their money
into a single huge accumulation and place the entire direction of its employment in the hands of men
they have never seen, with whom they never confer.” RIPLEY, MAIN STREET, supra note 9, at 5
(reproducing Woodrow Wilson’s 1910 annual address to the American Bar Association). Herbert
Hovenkamp has also noted that similar ideas were present in neoclassical finance theory since the
1920s. See Hovenkamp, Neoclassicism, supra note 7, passim.
34. See, e.g., Allen D. Boyer, Activist Shareholders, Corporate Directors, and Institutional
Investment: Some Lessons from the Robber Barons, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 977, 999 (1993) (Berle
and Veblen); Thomas McCraw, In Retrospect: Berle and Means, 18 REV. AM. HIST. 578, 579 (1990)
(Berle and Lippmann) [hereinafter Berle & Means].
35. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT (1914).
36. H.R. Rep. No. 1593 (1913), quoted in EDWARD S. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL,
CORPORATE POWER: A TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND STUDY 7 (1981). See also MELVIN UROFSKY,
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 321 (2009) (noting that Brandeis followed the Pujo hearings closely and
read the committee’s report in early 1913, as soon as it was issued).
37. UROFSKY, surpa note 36, at 321–22.
38. BRANDEIS, supra note 35, at 7–8.
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become the owners of so large a part of the stocks and bonds of our great
corporations.”39 Brandeis had identified the essence of the separation of
ownership and control, namely the dispersed, powerless shareholders,
but he concluded that this would leave power not with a corporation’s
managers, but with its bankers. This conclusion is not surprising in an
era when J. P. Morgan dominated U.S. investment banking and organized giant industrial combinations, and when such bankers’ control had
just been scrutinized by the Pujo Committee.40 These developments certainly disadvantaged shareholders, but shareholders were not Brandeis’s
real concern.41
Instead, the “separation” in the modern corporation that most worried Brandeis and that he believed was the fundamental problem of the
modern corporation was a growing separation between the corporation’s
managers and their firm. As the historian Melvin Urofsky noted, Brandeis believed that “[c]onsolidations created companies too big for their
managers to manage responsibly, because they could not know what was
happening in all of the divisions.”42 This separation, the necessary consequence of corporate consolidations, left the corporation unwieldy and
inefficient, able to survive by using its power to squash smaller competitors.43 While such separation may have harmed the corporation’s small
shareholders, it harmed others more, particularly the public. Brandeis
criticized the “Money Trust” legislation, legislation designed to break
banks’ power by prohibiting interlocking directorates. He argued that
“the provision would not safeguard the public[,] and [that] the primary
purpose of the Money Trust legislation is not to prevent directors from
injuring stockholders, but to prevent them from injuring the public.”44
Thus, the result of the separation of corporate management and ownership that most concerned Brandeis was the risk of giant corporations
harming the public and the small proprietors that they competed against,
not the shareholders.45
While Brandeis looked back to a time of small-scale proprietary capitalism, Walter Lippmann looked forward to the era of giant corpora39. Id. at 8. He also noted that over half the stockholders of the American Sugar Refining
Company and nearly half of the stockholders of the Pennsylvania Railroad and New York, New
Haven & Hartford were women, which to him signaled that they needed to be protected. See id.
40. See id. On “Morganization” and J.P. Morgan’s bank’s control and consolidation of firms,
see, for example, J. Bradford De Long, Did J. P. Morgan’s Men Add Value? An Economist’s Perspective on Financial Capitalism, in INSIDE THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
ON THE USE OF INFORMATION 205, 211–14 (Peter Temin ed., 1991).
41. See BRANDEIS, supra note 35, at 80, 131, 191, 199.
42. UROFSKY, supra note 36, at 322.
43. See UROFSKY, supra note 36, at 322 and passim.
44. BRANDEIS, supra note 35, at 80 (emphasis added).
45. See UROFSKY, supra note 36, at 397; BRANDEIS, supra note 35, at 205.
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tions. Lippmann discussed the separation of ownership and control in his
1913 paean to progressive planning, Drift and Mastery.46 Writing of
giant corporations, he noted that “[i]n the partnership and firm, owners
and managers are in general the same people, but the corporation has
separated ownership from management.”47 He also recognized, well before Berle and Means, that the consequence of this separation would be a
change in the very notion of ownership and property:
When a man buys stock in some large corporation he becomes in
theory one of its owners. He is supposed to be exercising his instinct of private property. But how in fact does he exercise that instinct[,] which we are told is the only real force in civilization? He
may never see his property. He may not know where his property is
situated. He is not consulted as to its management. He would be
utterly incapable of advice if he were consulted . . . . The processes
which make him rich in the morning and poor in the evening, increase his income or decrease it,[]are inscrutable mysteries. . . . No
one has ever had a more abstract relation to the thing he owned.48

What differentiates Lippmann from many later writers, including
Berle and Means, is that he did not see this separation as a problem. One
notable feature of his discussion is how little he cared about stockholders. He wrote,
You often hear it said that the stockholders must be made to realize
their duties. . . . But the notion that the 200,000 owners of the Steel
Trust can ever be aroused to energetic, public-spirited control of
‘their’ property—that is as fantastic as anything that ever issued
from the brain of a lazy moralist. Scattered all over the globe,
changing from day to day, the shareholders are the most incompetent constituency conceivable.49

Far from seeing shareholders as suffering or requiring greater protections
from management, he disparaged “ignorant stockholders . . . who don’t
know the difference between puddling and pudding.”50 He portrayed
them as “decadent”51 and as a slowly disappearing vestige. “Private
property will melt away,” he predicted, and “its functions will be taken
over by the salaried men who direct them, by the government commis46. See McCraw, Berle and Means, supra note 34, at 583; L. S. Zacharias, Repaving the Brandeis Way: The Decline of Developmental Property, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 596, 627 n.145 (1988) (noting
that Lippmann has been credited with anticipating Berle and Means’s view of property, though arguing the immediate source may have been Brandeis).
47. WALTER LIPPMANN, DRIFT AND MASTERY 48 (Prentice-Hall 1961) (1914).
48. Id. at 47.
49. Id. at 48.
50. Id. at 39–40.
51. Id. at 51.
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sions, [and] by developing labor unions. The stockholders deprived of
their property rights are being transformed into money-lenders.”52
For Lippmann, the separation of ownership and control was a welcome moment in social evolution. Power was shifting to management, to
the “salaried men” who were hired by the firm’s owners,53 and management was itself changing, transcending the profit-seeking behavior of
owner-operators and taking on a new social role.54 He wrote further:
[Managers] on salary, divorced from ownership and from bargaining[] . . . represent the revolution in business incentives at its very
heart. For they conduct giant enterprises and they stand outside the
higgling of the market, outside the shrewdness and strategy of competition. The motive of profit is not their personal motive. . . . The
administration of the great industries is passing into the hands of
men who cannot halt before each transaction and ask themselves:
what is my duty as the Economic Man looking for immediate
gain?55

He believed that managers, freed from shareholders, would also be freed
from the demands of the “profit system,” and they would use their expertise to become “industrial statesmen,” running the corporations in the
interest of society.56
The period’s most idiosyncratic take on the separation of ownership
and control may have been that of the radical economist Thorstein Veblen.57 Veblen discussed the separation of ownership and control quite

52. Id. at 49. This last passage is worth noting, for others during these decades also noted
shareholders’ roles had so changed in the early twentieth century that they should be viewed as,
essentially, loaning money to the corporation rather than becoming its owners—a view later reached
by some in the law-and-economics movement. See, e.g., BERLE & MEANS, MODERN CORPORATION,
supra note 1, at 279; E. Merrick Dodd, The Modern Corporation, Private Property, and Recent
Federal Legislation, 54 HARV. L. REV. 917, 921 (1941) (mentioning “an unorthodox theory that
corporate managements hire capital, . . . [and] our traditional assumption[s] that shareholders . . .
hire management”).
53. Though Lippmann also believed that, at the time he was writing, “control ha[d] passed for
the time being into the hands of . . . the banking interests.” LIPPMANN, supra note 47, at 51.
54. Such optimism concerning the businessman-as-statesman was a common feature of the era.
See, e.g., E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145,
1154–55 (1932).
55. LIPPMANN, supra note 47, at 43.
56. See William Leuchtenberg, Walter Lippmann’s ‘Drift and Mastery’, in LIPPMANN, supra
note 47, at 8–9.
57. There is a vast literature on Veblen. See William T. Ganley, The Theory of Business Enterprise and Veblen’s Neglected Theory of Corporation Finance, 38 J. ECON. ISSUES 397 (2004);
Forest G. Hill, Veblen, Berle, and the Modern Corporation, 26 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 279 (1967);
Rosalind Schulman, Absentee Ownership Reread, 21 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 319 (1962). This discussion of Veblen focuses on his views of separation of ownership and control, which is only one element of his works.
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early in his 1904 Theory of Business Enterprise58 and returned to it two
decades later in Absentee Ownership.59
There are passages in The Theory of Business Enterprise where
Veblen sounds like a herald of Berle and Means, writing that “[i]n so far
as invested property is managed by the methods of modern corporate
finance, . . . the management is separated from the ownership of the
property, more and more widely as the scope of corporation finance widens.”60 He also notes that the effect of modern finance is to “dissociate
ownership from management.”61
On closer examination, though, one discovers that these statements
must be interpreted through Veblen’s highly idiosyncratic views of corporate finance. The separation Veblen sees in the modern corporation—
at least as presented in Theory of Business Enterprise—is not, in any
straightforward way, a separation of shareholders and management. It is
instead a separation of two kinds of shareholders: passive owners of
common stock and managers who own preferred stock. According to
Veblen, modern corporations were increasingly capitalized based on the
value of both tangible assets (for example, machinery) and intangible
assets (for example, goodwill). Modern corporations also issued both
preferred and common shares, with only common shares voting. The
preferred shares had a claim on, in Veblen’s view, the more stable part of
the corporation’s worth, its tangible assets.62 Managers desirous of keeping control sold preferred shares to outside investors and kept the common shares for themselves. The result of this was to give the preferred
shareholders a prior claim on, and in effect to make them owners of, the
corporation’s tangible assets. This “method of capitalization,” Veblen
wrote, “effects a somewhat thoroughgoing separation between the management and the ownership of the industrial equipment. . . . [U]nder
corporate organization the owners of the industrial material have no
voice in its management[.]”63 Veblen, who looked skeptically at all
forms of corporate finance, appeared to believe that the “real” corporation was the firm’s tangible assets. Therefore, the preferred shareholders, who had a prior claim on these assets, were the corporation’s real
owners. Ultimately, he used this theory of corporate finance not to de58. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THEORY OF THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE (1904) [hereinafter THEORY].
59. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN RECENT
TIMES: THE CASE OF AMERICA (Viking Press 1964) (1923) [hereinafter ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP].
60. VEBLEN, THEORY, supra note 58, at 174–75.
61. Id. at 148 n.1.
62. Id. at 145–46.
63. Id. at 146. Veblen also believed that, given this structure, the managers, the preferred
holders, had incentives to manipulate the securities in a way that was harmful to the corporation.
See id. at 155–57.

2010]

The Birth of Corporate Governance

1261

fend these preferred shareholders, but to attack corporate managers and
their evanescent claims on the corporation. Veblen did not care about
powerless shareholders.
Absentee Ownership offers a somewhat different theory than the
earlier work but invites similar misreadings. To a reader familiar with
Berle and Means, the very title suggests an attack on the separation of
management and shareholding. Yet Veblen is again uninterested in that
separation. The absentee owners he discusses, far from being small vulnerable shareholders, are the idle rich, the parasites who have bought
shares and so own “essentially claims to unearned income[.]”64 While
absent, these investors still control the corporation—a “system of absentee ownership and control[.]”65
In Absentee Ownership, the separation that draws Veblen is between absentee owners and those who operate the corporation’s machinery and the industrial system as a whole. Absentee owners, he writes,
“are removed out of all touch with the working personnel or with the industrial work in hand, . . . and very much the same is true for the business agents of the absentee owners, the investment-bankers and the staff
of responsible corporation officials.”66 Not only are absentee owners
removed from the firms that they own, but also their interests are actively
hostile to such firms. This is because, Veblen argues, they need to restrict output in order to make money, an act that Veblen describes as “sabotage” of the industrial system.67 “The material interest of the underlying population is best served by a maximum output at a low cost, while
the business interests of the industry’s owners may best be served by a
moderate output at an enhanced price.”68 Nowhere do dispersed shareholders appear in Veblen’s account, and his concerns are far from those
of modern advocates of corporate governance. It should not be surprising
that Veblen, scornful of absentee owners and businessmen, would soon
be an advocate of Technocracy, the political ideology that favored replacing capitalism with a system run by engineers and whose rallying cry
was “production for use.”69
Thus, even before World War I, the idea of managerial dominance
of the corporation and lack of shareholder power was present in public
discourse, but in a variety of often conflicting forms. Yet those ideas
would not be given their enduring modern shape until The Modern Cor64. VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP, supra note 59, at 20 n.4.
65. Id. at 5.
66. Id. at 215–16.
67. Id. at 78 and passim.
68. Id. at 10.
69. See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE ENGINEERS AND THE PRICE SYSTEM (Viking Press 1965)
(1921).

1262

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 33:4

poration and Private Property appeared more than a decade later. To
understand why, we must look towards those ideas’ careers in the 1920s,
especially to the man who did most to popularize them, William Z. Ripley.
III. “PROFESSOR QUIXOTE”
In 1927, the radical journalist Stewart Chase reviewed William Z.
Ripley’s book Main Street and Wall Street for The Nation magazine.70
The book was a sharp attack on modern corporate management, one that
brought the idea of the separation of ownership and control and the problems it created to a mass audience. In his review, Chase dubbed Ripley
“Professor Quixote” and wrote that “[a]ll the world knows how a couple
of [Ripley’s] articles in the Atlantic Monthly swept the financial centers
of the country, put their author and his opinions into the headlines and
the editorials of every newspaper,” and forced changes at the New York
Stock Exchange.71 Underlying the review, however, is a sense of surprise; how did a “bespectacled professor” from Harvard’s economics
department come to terrorize Wall Street?
A. Race and Railroads
Born in 1867 outside of Boston, William Zebina Ripley was a
graduate of MIT and received his doctorate in political economy from
Columbia in 1893.72 In a time when the borders between the social
sciences were still fluid,73 his interests ranged widely. His dissertation
was a financial history of colonial Virginia.74 From 1893 to 1901 he
taught political science, sociology, and economics at MIT along with
sociology and anthropology at Columbia. In 1901, he moved to Harvard
as professor of economics, where he would spend the rest of his career.75
His first brush with fame came not as an economist but as an anthropologist, writing in the then-popular (now long discredited) field of
“scientific” racism. In 1899, Ripley published The Races of Europe, an
exhaustive work now considered to be “the most influential work on race
during the early years of this century.”76 Ripley spent over six hundred
70. See Stuart Chase, Professor Quixote, THE NATION, Mar. 9, 1927, at 263.
71. See id. at 263.
72. John F. Stover, William Zebina Ripley, AM. NAT. BIO. (Mark Carnes & John Garraty eds.,
1999); Prof. Wm. Ripley of Harvard Dies, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1941, at 39.
73. See, e.g., DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 94–95 (1991).
74. WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, THE FINANCIAL HISTORY OF VIRGINIA, 1609–1776 (1893).
75. Stover, supra note 72.
76. ERIC L. GOLDSTEIN, THE PRICE OF WHITENESS: JEWS, RACE, AND AMERICAN IDENTITY 44
(2006). For a discussion of Ripley’s “scientific” racism and its influence, see JOHN HIGHAM,
STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860–1925 154–56 (Rutgers Univer-
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pages arguing that previous scholars had erred in concluding there was
only one white, or Aryan, race in Europe.77 Instead, he argued that careful study, particularly the use of the “cephalic index” revealed by head
measurements, showed that there were three races native to Europe: Teutonic, Alpine, and Mediterranean.78 While the work focused on these
three groups, Ripley also examined the Jewish population of Europe,
writing darkly of the Jewish population in Eastern Europe and the danger
that this “swamp of miserable human beings . . . threatens to drain itself
off into our country.”79 It is little surprise that his work would find favor
with advocates of immigration restriction.80
What does this have to do with corporate governance? Directly,
very little. Ripley would later write critically of corporate managers and
Wall Street, but there is no trace in later writings of the kinds of antisemitism or conspiratorial thinking that characterized some populist opponents of Wall Street and corporate finance.81 Surprisingly, despite his
racial theorizing, Ripley’s own politics put him into the progressive tradition. In a 1909 essay, he wrote favorably of immigration and even intermarriage among ethnic groups, and called for an “active programme
of social betterment,” including “more and better schools[,]” “[h]umane
regulation of [factory] hours[,]” and revived trade unions.82 In 1916, he
was one of the few Harvard professors to support Louis Brandeis’s nomination to the Supreme Court.83
What his early career as a racial theorist does illustrate is that Ripley consistently reached out for a wide audience. The Races of Europe
began as a series of public lectures presented at Boston’s Lowell Institute, and earlier versions of some chapters were published in Popular
Science magazine.84 When Ripley sought an even broader audience for
sity Press 1988) (1955); JONATHAN PETER SPIRO, DEFENDING THE MASTER RACE: CONSERVATION,
EUGENICS, AND THE LEGACY OF MADISON GRANT 92–97 (2009); and NELL IRVIN PAINTER, THE
HISTORY OF WHITE PEOPLE 215–27 (2010).
77. WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, THE RACES OF EUROPE (1899). The work was well-received at the
time, see, for example, William Z. Ripley, The Races of Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1899, at
IM10, though subject to withering attack from Franz Boas, who would later demolish the pretences
of scientific racism, see Franz Boas, The Races of Europe, Science, Sept. 1, 1899, at 292 (book
review).
78. See RIPLEY, THE RACES OF EUROPE, supra note 77, at 103–04.
79. Id. at 372.
80. See SPIRO, supra note 76.
81. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 78–81 (Alfred
A. Knopf, Inc. 1966) (1955).
82. See William Z. Ripley, Race Progress and Immigration, 34 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 130, 136 (1909). Here Ripley even makes a few kind remarks about Jewish immigration.
See id. at 130.
83. See UROFSKY, supra note 36, at 446.
84. Boas, supra note 77, at 292; RIPLEY, THE RACES OF EUROPE, supra note 77, at v.
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his ideas after the turn of the century, he was able to publish articles on
racial issues, and later railroad organization and finance, in Atlantic
Monthly.85 Long before writing Main Street and Wall Street, Ripley was
adept at cultivating a public audience for his ideas.
His writing on race tapered off after the turn of the century as Ripley began building a reputation as perhaps the nation’s leading expert on
its indispensable and deeply troubled railroads.86 Railroads dominated
transportation, but this did not guarantee them economic success.87 Long
loathed by farmers, small merchants, and reformers, railroads had been
plagued for decades by overbuilding, destructive competition, and bankruptcies. By the early twentieth century, these perennial difficulties were
joined by growing government rate regulation.88 High and variable railroad rates had long been targets for reformers, but only after the turn of
the century did the federal government’s Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) gain clear legislative power to regulate them.89 Railroads’
troubles culminated with World War I when the federal government
seized the railroads and ran them directly.90
Ripley was both an expert on railroads and an active participant in
making railroad policy. Beginning with a stint at the U.S. Industrial
Commission in 1901, he held several significant positions, culminating
in 1920 when the ICC asked him to prepare a national plan for railroad
consolidation.91 Though his plan was voted down, he continued as a
consultant to the ICC through the 1920s.
Ripley’s work on railroads demonstrates his decidedly non-radical,
progressive orientation. He began his career as a critic of the railroads,
but after the ICC won the power to set rates he became more sympathetic
to the rail lines and their need for adequate income, warning that punitive

85. See William Z. Ripley, Federal Railroad Regulation, ATLANTIC, Mar. 1910, at 414; William Z. Ripley, Races in the United States, ATLANTIC, Dec. 1908, at 745; William Z. Ripley, President Roosevelt’s Railway Policy, ATLANTIC, Oct. 1905, at 377; William Z. Ripley, Race Factors in
Labor Unions, ATLANTIC, Mar. 1904, at 299.
86. William Stover described Ripley’s works as “among the most significant works on American railroads written in the generation before World War I.” Stover, supra note 72, at . See also
WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, RAILROADS: RATES AND REGULATION (1912); WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY,
RAILROADS: FINANCE AND ORGANIZATION (1915) [hereinafter RAILROADS: FINANCE].
87. JOHN F. STOVER, AMERICAN RAILROADS 96–97 (2d. ed. 1997).
88. See id. at 96–109.
89. The 1906 Hepburn Act gave the ICC power to establish “just and reasonable” maximum
rates for railroads, and the 1910 Mann-Elkins Act put the burden on railroads to show a proposed
rate increase was justified. Id. at 128–31.
90. See id. at 173.
91. Stover, supra note 72.
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rate setting could severely damage the rails.92 Ripley’s work on railroad
regulation may have been a proving-ground for his later writings on Wall
Street, for by the 1910s he was perhaps the leading expert on railroad
finance.
B. The Present Economic Revolution
When Ripley turned to studying corporate finance in the 1920s, he
found a field undergoing rapid changes. While the authors discussed in
the previous Part all recognized the spread of shareholding after 1900, it
was only after World War I that new retail shareholders flooded into the
market.93 The trend toward widened securities ownership had started
accelerating during World War I, as Americans purchased the popular
Liberty Bonds in record numbers to fund the war effort.94 At war’s end,
Americans, made comfortable with securities purchases, were further
encouraged to purchase bonds and, increasingly, stocks, by the spread of
national retail brokerages and, at many corporations, customer and employee stock ownership plans.95 Although exact numbers are hard to
come by, one recent study estimates that stock ownership increased from
“a few hundred thousand before World War I (about three percent of
U.S. households) to an estimated [eight] million by 1929 (roughly a
quarter of households).”96
An almost necessary consequence of the increase in investors was
the further dispersion of stock ownership, creating for the first time a
mass shareholding class. While some prewar writers had seen problems
lurking with the dispersal of stock ownership, the earliest postwar observers welcomed the trend.97 These writers heralded ever-widening
stock ownership as a salve for social problems because it promised to
give ordinary Americans a stake in the nation’s growing corporate econ92. See RIPLEY, RAILROADS: FINANCE, supra note 86, at v–vi (1916); see also RIPLEY,
PREFACE TO TRUSTS, POOLS, AND CORPORATIONS v (calling for “a reasonable policy of public control over monopolistic and corporate enterprises”).
93. As Lawrence Mitchell points out, the number of relatively small shareholders increased
before World War I, MITCHELL, SPECULATION, supra note 25, at 201–03, but share ownership really
spiked after World War I, as did public perception that the average American was investing in
stocks, which was an exaggeration. STEVE FRASER, EVERY MAN A SPECULATOR: A HISTORY OF
WALL STREET IN AMERICAN LIFE 391 (2005).
94. DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 105–
06 (1980).
95. Ott, When Wall Street, supra note 25, at 622–24.
96. Julia C. Ott, “The Free and Open People’s Market”: Political Ideology and Retail Brokerage at the New York Stock Exchange, 1913–1933, 96 J. AM. HIST. 44, 45 (2009) [hereinafter The
Free]. Ott does not deal with Ripley at length, but she does identify Ripley as the individual who
drew increasing attention to the separation of ownership and control in the 1920s. Id. at 62.
97. Perhaps excepting Veblen, whose Absentee Ownership appeared in 1922. See supra discussion in Part II. See VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP, supra note 59.
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omy.98 In 1925, Ripley’s Harvard economics colleague Thomas Nixon
Carver gave voice to this view in his work The Present Economic Revolution in the United States. Carver announced that widespread ownership would solve the “labor problem” by making small investors “small
capitalists.”99 A similar tack was taken by the philanthropist Robert
Brookings in Industrial Ownership, published the same year. In this
book, Brookings noted two crucial developments in twentieth-century
capitalism: the separation of ownership and management and the widening dispersal of share ownership, which he foresaw continuing until
ownership was “diffused among the largest share of the population.”100
Like Carver, Brookings saw no problems arising from these developments. While Berle and Means would see in the separation of ownership
and control an opportunity for managers to appropriate shareholder
wealth, Brookings concluded that the dispersal of ownership would have
the opposite effect, giving management an increasing sense of responsibility toward shareholders. “The widespread diffusion of ownership and
the increasing sense of responsibility to management to all the interested
parties,” he wrote, “point to a satisfactory solution of ‘the industrial
problem.’”101
Although not always noted by its proponents, these works’ sunny
vision of the ordinary American as shareholder also hints at a more fundamental shift in the orientation of corporate governance.102 If Carver
and Nixon were right that ordinary Americans’ wealth and security was
now tied directly to their status as shareholders, then the well-being of
shareholders qua shareholders suddenly jumped in importance.103 No
longer was the fundamental problem in corporation law to be that corporations damaged competitors or the public; now the chief concern in corporation law was for the shareholders. As the historian Julia Ott puts it,
under this vision of universal shareholder democracy, “the maximization

98. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) campaigned against regulation during this period
by promoting a vision of “shareholder democracy” as “a modern form of proprietary democracy
distinguished by universal ownership of shares.” Ott, The Free, supra note 96, at 64. Of course,
shareholder democracy was the very opposite of “proprietary democracy,” but the NYSE claimed
otherwise. Id. at 61–65.
99. THOMAS NIXON CARVER, THE PRESENT ECONOMIC REVOLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES
112 (1925).
100. ROBERT BROOKINGS, INDUSTRIAL OWNERSHIP: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE 9
(1925). Brookings was not himself a scholar but did fund what became the Brookings Institution.
101. Id. at 14.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 220–27.
103. Which is not to say that previous corporation law did not seek to protect shareholders, just
that shareholder protection was not always the overarching goal.
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of shareholders’ returns was the most important consideration in corporate governance and economic policy.”104
C. From Main Street to Wall Street
During the mid-1920s, William Ripley would bring the separation
of ownership and control before the public and spark a national debate
over corporate governance. His initial public foray was at a seemingly
modest venue, the annual meeting of New York’s Academy of Political
Science, where in November 1925 he gave a talk on “Two Changes in
the Nature and Conduct of Corporations,” which he asserted went to the
“very tap-root of our capitalistic system.” 105 The first was “the divorce
of ownership of property, represented by securities emitted by corporations or trustees, from any direct accountability, whatsoever, for its prudent and effective management.” The second was the diffusion of that
ownership, “the wide distribution of stock to employees and to consumers of the corporation’s product[.]”106 The result, Ripley announced, was
“the assumption of an absolute control by intermediaries—most commonly bankers[—] . . . in place of the former responsibility for direction
which, theoretically at least, rested upon the shoulders of the actual owners.”107
Some of Ripley’s conclusions had already been reached by others.
His critique of bankers’ control, in particular, sounded little different
from critiques made of Morgan decades before. He innovated, though,
when he identified two separate elements in what we have since lumped
together as the separation of ownership and control. To him, separation
of ownership and management was one problem, exacerbated by dispersed shareholding. This latter development turned the separation of
ownership and control into a problem for the general public.
His attack took on urgency because, he claimed, the separation of
ownership and control had reached a tipping point. Neither the separation nor shareholder passivity was new, he admitted; shareholders had
“always been inert, delegating most of their power,” but there had still
104. Ott, The Free, supra note 96, at 64. In a similar vein, Daila Tsuk Mitchell has pointed out
that in Berle and Means’s telling, there are two classes in modern corporate society, managers and
shareholders, with labor nowhere to be found. See Dalia Tsuk, Corporations Without Labor: The
Politics of Progressive Corporate Law, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1861, 1884 (2003).
105. See William Z. Ripley, Two Changes in the Nature and Conduct of Corporations, 11
PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI. N.Y. 143, 143 (1926) [hereinafter Two Changes]. The speech was also excerpted in W. Z. Ripley, More Power to the Bankers, NATION, Dec. 2, 1925, at 618, and later republished in the Congressional Record, 67 CONG. REC. 7719–20 (cited in Seligman, supra note 7, at 695
n.50).
106. Ripley, Two Changes, supra note 105, at 145.
107. Id. at 143.
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remained the possibility that they might “be stimulated to assert themselves.”108 New innovations in corporate finance promised to put an end
to that. He illustrated his point by citing the recent public offering of
Dodge Brothers, Inc. Purchased by the banking house of Dillon, Reed in
1924 for $146,000,000, the investment house took the automaker public
again a year later, selling $160,000,000 of bonds and preferred and
common stock. But, Ripley pointed out, the new Dodge Bros. had a new
kind of capital structure with two kinds of common stock, “Class A” and
“Class B.” Only the Class B stock had voting power.109 Dillon Reed,
unsurprisingly, sold the Class A and kept the Class B, stripping all power
from most of the company’s putative owners. How, Ripley asked his
audience, “can there be other than a whirlwind of abuse of power under
such conditions?”110 For all Ripley’s criticism of corporate controllers,
however, he offered only anodyne solutions to the problem in his speech,
calling for better publicity for corporate accounts and standardized accounting under the aegis of a revamped Federal Trade Commission
(FTC).111
What separated Ripley from the cheerleaders for shareholder democracy was that he emphasized the dangers inherent in widening ownership—a point made by an editorial the New York Times published after
his talk. It said that Ripley’s talk had cast “the corrosive of a doubt” on
previous “rejoicing over the wide diffusion of ownership in the nation’s
industries[.]”112 In linking widening ownership and the separation of
ownership and control, Ripley also looked forward to modern debates on
corporate governance by moving the shareholder to the center of concern. “Precisely as the ‘trust’ of old menaced the consumer,” concluded
the Times, “closed management of corporations menaces the diffused
owner.”113
Ripley’s speech garnered wide attention. The New York Times devoted two columns to it the next day and reported that it had “stirred the
assembly.”114 It made the Wall Street Journal soon thereafter. The
108. Id. at 144.
109. See id. at 145.
110. Id. at 144. Nor was Dodge Bros. the only firm to issue nonvoting common stock; the first
firm to issue nonvoting ‘Class A’ stock was in 1916, and in 1924 to 1925, over a dozen firms issued
nonvoting common stock of the kind Ripley decried. See The Development of Class A and Class B
Stocks, 6 HARV. BUS. REV. 332 (1926). Frank Partnoy has recently attributed the popularity of Class
B non-voting stock to the Swedish entrepreneur and fraud, Ivar Kreuger. FRANK PARTNOY, THE
MATCH KING: IVAR KREUGER, THE FINANCIAL GENIUS BEHIND A CENTURY OF WALL STREET
SCANDALS 75–77 (2009).
111. Ripley, Two Changes, supra note 105, at 144.
112. The New Capitalist, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1925, at E8.
113. Id.
114. Bankers’ Control of Trade Deplored, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1925, at 27.
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Journal reported that Ripley’s speech had met “with considerable interest” from bankers, enough so that the Bank of America felt compelled to
issue a statement stoutly denying Ripley’s charges and stating there was
no need for further government regulation of business.115 In midNovember, a speaker at the New York Banker’s Institute more forcefully
rebutted Ripley’s claims, and echoed Thomas Carver’s earlier conclusions, insisting that diffuse ownership in fact benefitted shareholders
while giving “the responsible executives of the utilities more of a sense
of fiduciary accountability to these investor-owners and less of a sense of
control by a few men, inside or outside of banking circles.”116
Over the next year, Ripley would conduct a campaign that would
inject the separation of ownership and control and the diffusion of stock
ownership into the center of public debate, lead to significant changes by
the New York Stock Exchange, and even involve the President of the
United States. It began with his New York speech and gained steam in
January 1926, when Ripley expanded upon his charges in an article entitled, From Main Street to Wall Street, in the Atlantic Monthly, then one
of the nation’s most-read magazines.117 With a title playing off Sinclair
Lewis’s recent novel Main Street—indeed, Ripley appears to have invented the “Main Street and Wall Street” cliché118—the article caused a
national sensation. If remembered at all, the article is now remembered
for launching a campaign against nonvoting common stock,119 but its
ambit was larger. It was an attack on modern corporate governance.
From Main Street to Wall Street opened with a somewhat strained
parable about a young man from Maine who was given shares in the local power company by his father. The father gave his son a short lecture
on the duties of ownership along with the shares: “You must never forget
that you are partly responsible for this undertaking. . . . That responsibility is an inseparable part of your ownership.”120 Quoting Justice Brandeis, the father continued:
‘There is no such thing to my mind . . . as an innocent shareholder.
He may be innocent in fact, but he cannot be held innocent. He accepts the benefits of the system. It is his business and his obligation
to see that those who represent him carry out a policy which is consistent with the public welfare.’ . . . This accountability for wealth
115. Will Nassau, In and Out of the Banks, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1925, at 9.
116. Professor Ripley and the Facts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1925, at 14 (quoting H. M. Brundage).
117. See William Z. Ripley, From Main Street to Wall Street, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan. 1926,
at 94 [hereinafter From Main Street].
118. See RIPLEY, MAIN STREET, supra note 9, at vii.
119. See Seligman, supra note 7, at 693–99.
120. Ripley, From Main Street, supra note 117, at 94.

1270

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 33:4

underlies and justifies the whole institution of private property upon
which the government of our great country is founded.121

Yet economic developments in Ripley’s story soon thwarted the
son’s attempt to exercise the responsibilities of ownership. A utility
holding company bought the small Maine power company, and the son
found his ownership transmuted into ownership of shares in a national
firm, based in Chicago with tens of thousands of shareholders and owning power companies in states from Maine to Oklahoma to Nebraska.122
“It began to look indeed as if the days of the simple life and of direct responsibility of ownership were by way of passing in the field of public
utilities in New England.”123
Ripley’s critique was not limited to utilities holding companies, a
major issue in the 1920s. When his Maine shareholder looked for a corporation to invest in where he could exercise the responsibilities of ownership, the son found that firms used voting trusts and pyramiding ownership to avoid shareholder involvement. “Hopeless indeed did it appear
that any uninitiated public investor could understand, much less participate intelligently in, any of these affairs.”124
According to Ripley, these developments not only cut shareholders
off from a voice in their corporations but also undermined the traditional
justifications offered for private property. “What an amazing tangle this
all makes of the theory that ownership of property and responsibility for
its efficient, public-spirited, and far-sighted management shall be linked
one to the other.”125 The developments enabled managerial exploitation
of shareholders, for under such arrangements it was likely that management’s interests would diverge from shareholders’ interests. Ripley explained,
All managers—that is to say, the operating men—are working on
salary, their returns, except on the side, being largely independent of
the net result of company operation year by year. The motive of
self-interest may even have been thrown into the reverse, occasionally, so far as long-time upbuilding in contradistinction to quick
turnover in corporate affairs is concerned.126

121. Id. (quoting LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 74–75 (Osmand K. Fraenkel ed., 1935)).
122. See id. at 94–95.
123. Id. at 95.
124. Id. at 96.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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The new system not only threatened shareholders but also the entire economic order: “Veritably, the institution of private property, underlying
our whole civilization, is threatened at the root unless we take heed.”127
Having set out the overarching problem, Ripley then concentrated
his fire on nonvoting common stock, which he believed threatened to put
“at rest the last vestige of power of participation of the owners of property in prudent and efficient management.”128 Nonvoting common stock
threatened shareholders in two ways. First, it left them open to managerial exploitation, and second, it destroyed any responsibility they felt
for their property, resulting in a “bald and outrageous theft of the last title
of responsibility for management of the actual owners by those who are
setting up these latest financial erections.”129
Nonvoting stock was a major problem, but not the only one Ripley
tackled in the article. Another was the diffusion of stock ownership, encouraged in the 1920s by the growth of employee and consumer stock
purchase plans, a development that would only concentrate more power
in managers.130 The “wide distribution of stock to employees and the
consumers of the corporation’s product, . . .” he wrote, would have an
effect that was “bound to be cumulative with that of the insinuation of
professional management power between ownership and operation.”131
“[T]he larger the number of shareholders,” Ripley wrote, “the more easily may a small concentrated block of minority shares exercise control
over all the rest. . . . With 300,000 scattered holdings, a possible [fifteen]
or [twenty] percent of the votes can never be overmatched at an election.”132
But what to do about these developments? Ripley, unlike Louis
Brandeis, did not call for the restoration of a perhaps mythical era of
small corporations and proprietor-managers. Nor did he assert that
shareholder disengagement from active management was new. “It will
be objected,” he wrote, “that no real change is involved in these recent
tendencies[,] that stockholders never did, and never will, exercise their
voting rights.”133 Yet, he continued, the mere potential for shareholder
action mattered: “[E]very once in a blue moon some resolute individual
or stockholder could rise . . . and organize a protective committee or dis127. Id.
128. Id. at 97.
129. Id. at 97–98.
130. The spread of ownership through ESOPs in the 1920s has gained scholarly attention. See
STUART BRANDES, AMERICAN WELFARE CAPITALISM (1976). But much less attention has been
paid to dispersal of ownership through consumer-purchase plans.
131. Ripley, From Main Street, supra note 117, at 99.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 100.
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senting group.”134 This would be foreclosed if “the people who own that
property have allowed themselves to be utterly divorced from the exercise of their natural right to elect the directors and to influence . . . the
corporate policy.”135
In his article, Ripley put forward a flurry of proposals for solving
the problems he identified. Perhaps bondholders should be enfranchised
as well as shareholders, cumulative voting more widely adopted, or the
federal government could regulate holding companies.136 But Ripley’s
main solution was publicity. During the 1920s, required disclosure was
minimal to nonexistent.137 State-mandated disclosure, he believed,
would reveal “the amount of gross business, the cost of conducting it,
and especially the policy respecting upkeep and depreciation” at a corporation. Disclosure would also aid the shareholder who, even if not
equipped to personally evaluate the data, would be able to benefit from
the “intelligent judgment of competent experts” who could provide such
analysis.138
Ripley closed his first article by demanding that his readers recognize “there is something the matter.”139 It had not yet reached a crisis
point, but it was becoming more pressing with the “great incursion into
the field of investment by the common people—corporate possession
being shared by those of moderate and small means with the wealthy
class.”140 What, he asked, “would be the effect were these newcomers . . . to discover some day that ownership and control had parted
company, each going its way as ships that pass in the night?”141 The vision of ownership remaining with the people, while control rested in the
“great financial centers,” led Ripley to foresee greater problems and damaging social divisions. He wrote, “We have had the experience, to our
sorrow, with the old sectional divisions between the East and the West.
Is there no smoldering spark in this matter of corporate control, which
may some day flare up as a political issue of the first order?”142
The “spark in this matter” turned out to be Ripley’s own article,
though he may have been surprised that public anger focused on only one
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 102, 103, 106.
137. While large corporations made some disclosures due to such influences as the listing
requirements of the NYSE or state blue sky laws, many also evaded them and released little if any
useful information. See Harwell Wells, No Man Can be Worth $1,000,000 a Year: The Fight over
Executive Compensation in 1930s America, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 689, 707–08 (2010).
138. Ripley, From Main Street, supra note 117, at 104.
139. Id. at 107.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 108.
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of his targets: nonvoting common stock.143 Within weeks of From Main
Street to Wall Street’s publication, an outcry arose sufficient to force the
New York Stock Exchange to disapprove an issue of nonvoting common
for the first time, and thereafter, it refused to list such stock.144 Later that
year, the ICC disapproved a reorganization that included a voting trust,
stating that “the public interest requires that the entire body of the stockholders of a railroad . . . and not a powerful few, shall be responsible for
management.” The New Jersey Public Utility Commission blocked a
stock issue loaded with nonvoting shares on similar grounds soon after.145 That spring, several corporations that reorganized their capital
structure specifically rejected the use of nonvoting common stock, and in
announcements of their actions, they “called attention along with other
‘selling points’ to the fact that all stock carried full voting rights.”146 So
loud was the public outcry that in February 1926 President Calvin Coolidge met with Ripley at the White House to discuss the problem of nonvoting common stock.147
Ripley’s campaign against managerial power stirred not only policy-makers but also the general public. In perhaps the most telling example of the attention garnered by his crusade, the New York World published a poem in the spring of 1926 entitled, “On Waiting in Vain for the
New Masses to Denounce Nonvoting Stock,” which may also have made
a wry commentary on the plight of the retail shareholder compared to
that of the real working class:
Then you who drive the fractious nail
And you who lay the heavy rail,
And all who bear the dinner pail
And daily punch the clock—
Shall it be said your hearts are stone?
They are your brethren and they groan!
Oh, drop a tear for those who own
Nonvoting corporate stock.148

While nonvoting stock tended to dominate press coverage in the
spring of 1926, Ripley’s broader concerns also gained currency, in part
because nonvoting stock served as a synecdoche for shareholders’ more
143. The episode is recounted in Seligman, supra note 7, at 693–99.
144. See id. at 697. The NYSE disapproved a nonvoting issue for Fox Theaters on January 18,
1926. Id.
145. Id. at 696.
146. Preston Lockwood, The Voting Rights of Stockholders: A Resume of a Current Controversy, 113 BANKERS’ MAGAZINE 19, 20 (1926).
147. See Seligman, supra note 7, at 695–96; President Studies Non-Voting Stocks, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 17, 1926, at 1.
148. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET, supra note 9, at 121.
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pervasive loss of control. Thus, a 1926 article in the New York Times
entitled, “Voteless Stock Stirs Wall Street,” presented the case against
nonvoting stock while also summarizing Ripley’s larger concerns.149 In
its account, nonvoting common stock was only a symptom of more basic
changes in corporate governance. For instance, the article described the
Dodge Brothers reorganization as “typical of a movement, gaining momentum rapidly during the past few years, that tends to shift the entire
centre of industrial control from the ‘owner,’ in the traditional sense of
the word, to the investment banker.” Alongside nonvoting common
stock, it highlighted the dispersal of stock ownership and the growth of
complex holding companies as causes of that shift.150 “In this divorce of
ownership from responsibility, of financial risk from actual control,” it
continued, “the critics see the likelihood of a dangerous abuse of power.”151
Ripley’s crusade had quickly defeated nonvoting stock, but its larger goals were not so easily reached.152 In August 1926, he followed with
a second article in the Atlantic entitled, Stop, Look, Listen! The Shareholder’s Right to Adequate Information,153 where he expanded on his
attack on corporate reporting, again framing this specific problem as an
outgrowth of more basic economic changes.
The article opened with a labored metaphor. Two roads intersected,
initially unregulated and little-traveled. As the volume of traffic increases, Ripley wrote, as inattentive, “careless or drunken drivers” appear,
“then as the appalling records of death and casualties betokens, the time
has come for public supervision of the crossways.”154 To fix the problem, “the simple remedy of visibility suggests itself.”155 The comparison
is clear:
Main Street and Wall Street have come to cross one another at right
angles—Main Street, our synonym for this phenomenon of widespread ownership, and Wall Street, as applied to the well-known
aggregation of financial and of directorial power in our great capital
centres. This intersection of interest[s], so often at cross-purposes,
149. See Evans Clark, Voteless Stock Stirs Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1926 at XX1.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Something noted by at least one editor of the New Republic, who wrote in February 1926
that the NYSE’s banning of nonvoting common would be only a “half-hearted remedy for one minor
aspect of a major evil,” the evil being that “we have lost the principle of responsible ownership,
which is the chief justification of the capitalist order.” The Week, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 10,
1926, at 308.
153. William Z. Ripley, Stop, Look, Listen! The Shareholder’s Right to Adequate Information,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1926, at 380–399 [hereinafter Stop, Look, Listen!].
154. Id. at 380.
155. Id.
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is marked by an imminent danger of collision at the junction point
of ownership and management.156

His solution to the intersection between Main Street and Wall Street was
better visibility; in the corporate context, more publicity.
At the time, corporations were required to produce little or no information for shareholders, and this lack of financial data was Ripley’s
target.157 While some firms regularly issued audited balance sheets and
income statements, many did not, and Ripley did not hesitate to attack
those firms whose disclosures he judged insufficient. Indeed, part of his
popularity was his willingness to name names. Firms such as Singer
Manufacturing and Royal Baking Powder, he reported, gave shareholders
essentially no financial information, while many others provided at best a
short balance sheet.158 Even corporations providing more copious information often failed to explain how figures were reached, a major problem in an era before standardized accounting rules.159
Ripley’s discussion of corporate information highlights a disjunction in his views of the shareholder, one marking a transition from older
views of activist shareholders to a new recognition of the shareholder as,
chiefly, a passive investor.160 He believed that additional information
would help the shareholder, but this raised the question of how exactly
the shareholder would benefit from it. At times, Ripley had held out
some hope for at least an attenuated version of shareholder activism,
suggesting that better information would create a more engaged shareholder. In From Main Street to Wall Street, he highlighted a few instances where individual shareholders were able to “overcome a corporate Goliath,” including the long shareholder campaign waged by Charles
and Philip Cabot, which in the 1910s eventually persuaded U.S. Steel to
abandon the twelve-hour workday.161 In his 1927 book Main Street and
Wall Street, however, Ripley conceded that most shareholders had no
desire or ability to become involved in corporate management:
[A]ny plan for the greater democratization of corporate management which is based upon the expectation of a general active partic156. Id. at 380–81.
157. See Wells, supra note 137, at 737–38.
158. See Ripley, Stop, Look, Listen!, supra note 153, at 382.
159. See id. at 388–93.
160. The view of the shareholder as chiefly an investor was already dominant by the 1910s.
Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of Shareholder Democracy, 63 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1503, 1517 (2006).
161. Ripley, From Main Street, supra note 117, at 100. The actual story of how the Cabots
pressured U.S. Steel into dropping the 12-hour day is considerably more complex than in Ripley’s
telling. See Charles Hill, Fighting the Twelve-Hour Day in the American Steel Industry, 15 LAB.
HIS. 19, 21–23 and passim (1974).
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ipation by the whole body of shareholders is bound to go wrong
from the crossing of the wire. . . . The average stockholder is entirely unqualified to engage actively in management. For a surprisingly large number of great corporations more than half of the
shareholders are women. . . . Such a multitude are ill-fitted by training—begging the moot point of sex—to govern directly, less so
than in politics. . . . Even the men by themselves, for the most part,
have neither time, impulse, nor capacity for such concerns. The
very practice of scattering investments, spreading the risk, would in
a considerable estate constitute an aggregate burden of bother which
would be backbreaking.162

Information would typically not, Ripley concluded, help shareholders be better governors of the corporation. Instead, it would help them in
their role as investors. Once corporate information was provided, he
wrote, “specialists, analysts, bankers, and others will promptly disseminate the information.”163 This was an interesting concession. Even as
Ripley searched for ways to maintain the shareholder franchise, he admitted that, in this context, it would not be effective. Shareholders
would benefit from better information not because it would empower
them to better participate in management but because it would indirectly
protect their economic interests: “This, then, is the ultimate defense of
publicity. It is not as an adjunct to democratization through exercise of
voting power, but as a contribution to the making of a true market
price.”164
As to how information should be forced from corporations, Ripley
quickly discarded proposals for self-regulation and public pressure.
While he praised the NYSE’s disclosure mandates, he concluded they
were easily avoided by any firm that did not wish to trade on that exchange.165 Nor was state-level regulation a solution, as the weakness of
state “blue-sky” securities laws showed they could easily be avoided.166
His solution was federal action, specifically for the FTC to require detailed disclosure by corporations. Ripley closed his article with an argument that the FTC already had the statutory authority to require disclosure, if only it wished.167

162. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET, supra note 9, at 129–30.
163. Ripley, Stop, Look, Listen!, supra note 153, at 385.
164. Id.
165. See id. at 394–95. Even the listing requirements were only of limited use; while they
required the production of copious data, the figures were available for public inspection only at the
NYSE. See id. at 395.
166. See id. at 397–98.
167. See id. at 398–99. Ripley’s argument turned on an interpretation of Section 6 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Id.
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Ripley’s second article again shook Wall Street—this time more
literally. Advance copies of Stop, Look, Listen! reached New York early
on August 24, 1926. By the middle of the day, many brokerages were
referring to the article in market comments they circulated to customers
and brokers, apparently highlighting the damage Ripley’s criticisms
could do to public confidence in corporations and the possibility that
they would lead to new reporting requirements.168 The result, according
to market observers, was a sharp-sell off that sent the market lower at the
end of the day.169 While some on Wall Street actually favored better disclosure—it had been a cause of the NYSE’s for the past year—many
others feared disclosure or at least feared Ripley’s criticisms.
The article also caused ripples in the nation’s capital. Days after it
appeared, several FTC Commissioners insisted that the FTC Act did not
give them the authority Ripley claimed.170 The President was soon
drawn into the debate as well. Coolidge was reported to have spent some
of the summer studying corporate issues, “inspired by Professor Ripley’s
previous utterances on nonvoting stock.”171 Yet, while Coolidge claimed
to be “in full sympathy” with better corporate reporting, he rejected federal intervention, reasoning that corporations “get their life from [s]tate
laws” and thus reporting requirements were a state concern.172
Stop, Look, Listen! also kept Ripley in the spotlight. The month it
appeared, the New York Times ran a profile entitled When Ripley Speaks,
Wall Street Heeds, which opened with the surprised observation that “the
Stock Exchange, the bankers, the big investment corporations, and the
corporate lawyers have taken quite seriously a criticism of their system
and practices which comes from the occupant of an academic chair at
Harvard University.”173 As his star rose, however, Ripley became the
target of more pointed criticism. Shortly after the appearance of Stop,
Look, Listen!, his claims came under fire from conservative Wall Street
lawyer Gilbert Montague, who expanded his criticisms in an article entitled More Government in Business—Does Wall Street Need It, or Main
Street Want It?174 Montague’s answer was, of course, “No,” and he took
168. New Ripley Attack Stirs Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1926, at 1.
169. See id.; see also Publicity and Stock Prices, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 1926, at 1.
170. See Against Ripley’s Plan: Majority of Trade Commission Doubts Its Legality, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 26, 1926, at 21. Ripley may have been too optimistic about the FTC’s power to compel
reports from corporations, at least in a time before a broad reading of the Commerce Clause. See
Milton Handler, The Constitutionality of Investigations by the Federal Trade Commission: II, 28
COLUM. L. REV. 905, 930–37 (1928).
171. Coolidge Believes State Should Guard Holders of Stock, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1926, at 1.
172. Id.
173. When Ripley Speaks, Wall Street Heeds, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1926, at SM7.
174. Says Ripley Plan Runs Afoul of the Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1926, at Fin. 22 (providing comments of Gilbert Montague); Gilbert H. Montague, More Government in Business—Does
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pains to insist, against a wide array of evidence, that corporations’ officers and directors were providing shareholders more than sufficient information and always stood ready to answer any additional requests for
information that might come from shareholders.175
A more substantial and subtle response addressed not only Ripley’s
worries about corporate disclosure but also his underlying analysis of
dispersed ownership and the separation of ownership and control. In an
interview that appeared a month after Stop, Look, Listen!, General Motors (GM) president Alfred P. Sloan answered Ripley’s criticisms.176
After defending GM’s reports to shareholders (which were remarkably
transparent for the day) and insisting less plausibly that he did not know
of a corporate executive who felt “resentful of public curiosity about his
company’s affairs,” Sloan then turned to a second question: “Can a corporation have too many stockholders?”177 At some point, Sloan conceded, a corporation’s ownership could be too widespread: “[T]here is a
point beyond which diffusion of stock ownership must enfeeble the corporation by depriving it of virile interest in management upon the part of
some one man or group of men to whom its success is a matter of personal and vital interest.”178 GM, however, had found a happy medium.
While it had 70,000 small shareholders, they owned only forty percent of
its stock; the remaining sixty percent was held by a “small group of
men,” mainly the DuPont family, though Sloan did not name them.179 In
Ripley’s terms, GM had a “control group.” To Ripley, a control group,
which he depicted most often as investment bankers rather than large
shareholders, posed a threat to shareholders that increased with shareholding dispersal among small investors. In Sloan’s telling, however, the
existence of a control group was not a problem but “the strongest possible safeguard of the public interest.”180 Such a control group would “lose
no opportunity to see that the management is sound, industrious, and
progressive,” a development that would benefit all shareholders, majority
Wall Street Need It, or Main Street Want It?, 119 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 138 (1927).
While Montague’s article was published in 1927, it was a response to Stop, Look, Listen! and included the arguments made in 1926. On Montague, see generally Wyatt C. Wells, Counterpoint to
Reform: Gilbert Montague and the Business of Regulation, 78 BUS. HIST. REV. 433 (2004).
175. Montague, supra note 174, at 140.
176. See Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., Modern Ideals of Big Business, W ORLD ’S WORK 695, 697
(1926). Sloan’s article is clearly a response to Ripley’s magazine articles, and was even billed as
such in one advertisement for that issue, though Ripley’s name is never mentioned in Sloan’s article.
See Advertisement, Shall Corporation Secrets be Disclosed to Stockholders?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,
1926, at 12.
177. Sloan, supra note 176, at 695, 697.
178. Id. at 697.
179. Id. at 698.
180. Id.
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and minority alike.181 Sloan had taken two of the main targets of Ripley’s criticism—the existence of minority controlling groups and dispersed, powerless shareholders—and argued that they were both
strengths of the system.
In the fall of 1926, Ripley’s campaign moved into higher gear.
Two months after the Atlantic published the article on corporate publicity, it published a third. More Light!—and Power Too was both an attack
on the pyramided utilities holding companies assembled during the
1920s and another opportunity to reiterate the themes of Ripley’s previous two articles.182 Since the end of World War I, Ripley argued, utilities holding companies had sprung up and then consolidated across the
nation, often with multiple levels of holding companies standing between
a local utility and a national parent.183 Their complex capital structures
and layered ownership often allowed control to be wielded by those controlling the topmost firm, even if they held only a small ownership stake
in the whole complex.184 The holding companies’ baffling capital structures also made fraud easier—or, as Ripley wrote in his distinctive style,
increased the “temptation afforded to prestidigitation, double-shuffling,
hornswoggling, and skullduggery.”185 As utilities in the 1920s moved
aggressively to sell shares to their customers—Ripley estimating that
1,307,000 customers of utilities were now also shareholders—their financial shenanigans not only threatened the public generally but also
endangered shareholders with particular force.186 Yet for all his concerns, Ripley’s proposed solution was, as had been the case in the previous articles, mild. While he implied that national regulation of utilities
would be appropriate, all he called for in his article was a comprehensive
study of the utilities by the National Power Commission.187
Though each of Ripley’s articles garnered public attention, his crusade for better corporate governance appeared to be building towards the
publication of a book collecting and expanding upon his articles. Main
Street and Wall Street was published in February 1927. It is a book that
raises “what-ifs,” for while the book proved a best-seller, Ripley was not
181. Id.
182. See William Z. Ripley, More Light!—and Power Too, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1928,
at 667 [hereinafter More Light!].
183. Id. As Ripley noted, one reason for holding companies was state laws requiring utilities
to be held by companies incorporated in-state; if, say, a Wisconsin firm wished to own a Minnesota
utility, it would have to do so through a Minnesota corporation. Id. at 669. This did not, however,
explain the multiple levels of companies held.
184. See generally JAMES C. BONBRIGHT & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE HOLDING COMPANY:
ITS PUBLIC SIGNIFICANCE AND ITS REGULATION (1932).
185. Ripley, More Light!, supra note 182, at 671.
186. Id. at 685.
187. See id. at 687.
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able to use it as a springboard to further attacks on corporate ills. A
month before its publication in January 1927, Ripley was riding in a taxicab to give a speech to the annual meeting of the American Bar Association in New York City when his cab was struck by a drunk driver.188 He
suffered a severe head injury in the crash and, shortly thereafter, a nervous breakdown.189 At precisely the moment when American capitalism
entered its frenzied phase and his book was gaining high praise, Ripley
was removed from the scene. He was out of the public spotlight for
more than two years. While accounts of Ripley dot newspapers throughout 1926, further reports of his activities do not appear again until the
end of 1929 when he was finally well enough to resume teaching at Harvard.190
Main Street and Wall Street appeared to great acclaim.191 The “underlying thought” in the work, Ripley acknowledged, was hardly new;
his intellectual forebears included Brandeis, Lippmann, and Woodrow
Wilson, each of whom had identified the separation of ownership and
control of corporate property.192 But, Ripley continued, the problem had
been fundamentally changed, and made newly important, by “the great
increase in popular investment in business and other corporations.”193 It
was the “transformation of hitherto purely personal businesses, closely
owned, into very widely held and loosely governed public enterprises . . . which brings the problem of corporate organization and government into such peculiar prominence at this time.”194
For the most part the work gathered up and expanded on Ripley’s
three articles from the Atlantic, with a few additions. The first chapter
was not by Ripley at all, but an address given by Woodrow Wilson in
1910 which drove home both Ripley’s general themes about managerial
power and, in particular, his contention that the corporation had changed
the nature of a shareholder’s property. As Wilson noted, the minority
shareholder of a corporation “does not seem to enjoy any of the substan-

188. See Prof. Ripley Injured in an Auto Crash, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1927, at 1.
189. See Prof. Ripley Improving, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1927, at E3. Ripley may have suffered
from mental illness before or suffered permanent effects from his head injury; his death in 1941 was
reputed to have been a suicide. JONATHAN P. SPIRO, DEFENDING THE MASTER RACE 96 (2009).
190. See S.T. Williams, William Z. Ripley—and Some Others, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1929, at
XX2.
191. See McChesney, supra note 7, at 237–38 (finding only one review of Ripley’s work unfavorable).
192. See RIPLEY, MAIN STREET, supra note 9, at vi. Ripley does not squarely say that the
separation of ownership and control is the “underlying thought” shared with these earlier thinkers,
but it seems obvious. See id.
193. Id. at vi–vii.
194. Id. at vii.
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tial rights of property in connection” with his stocks.195 Also, two later
chapters dealing with railroad reorganization were completely new.196
Main Street and Wall Street’s main points would have been familiar
to readers of the Atlantic pieces: corporations were fast-growing and
supplanting other business forms; managers were whittling away at the
remnants of shareholder power; power over corporate property had been
separated from its ownership; and wider dispersion of ownership and the
new retail shareholder only accelerated the shift in power. Once more,
Ripley linked all these developments to two fundamental changes, “the
progressive diffusion of ownership on the one hand and of the everincreasing concentration of managerial power on the other.”197
One shift in emphasis between the Atlantic articles and the book
might have been noticed by astute readers: the book paid new attention to
recent changes in corporation law that had allowed “the steady encroachment of management on shareholder rights.”198 Those already
familiar with Ripley’s attack on nonvoting stock were introduced to additional legal changes, which, Ripley asserted, undermined shareholder
power. They learned how state competition for corporate charters encouraged managerial power and impeded state-level regulation,199 of the
growing use of no-par stock, which Ripley believed would destroy a
shareholder’s ability to evaluate the finances of his firm,200 and of grants
of indemnity in corporate charters intended to shield managers from any
liability for errors or conflicts of interest.201
In providing a brief summary of legal developments, this section of
Main Street and Wall Street presages the much more thorough account
given several years later in Berle and Means’s The Modern Corporation
and Private Property. This is unsurprising, as by 1927 Ripley had become a friend and patron of Adolf A. Berle, Jr. Berle had actually been a
student of Ripley’s at Harvard College—as had many others, including
Franklin Roosevelt—but they renewed their acquaintance in 1925 when
Berle, then a successful corporation lawyer, began teaching a class on

195. WOODROW WILSON, ANNUAL ADDRESS TO THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (1910),
reprinted in RIPLEY, MAIN STREET, supra note 9, at 13. Despite Ripley’s use of Wilson’s talk, much
of Wilson’s ire appeared directed at older debates concerning corporate personhood, which died out
by the mid-1920s. See RIPLEY, MAIN STREET, supra note 9, at 3–15.
196. See RIPLEY, MAIN STREET, supra note 9, at 229–75.
197. Id. at 131.
198. Id. at 37. Some of these changes were mentioned in the Atlantic articles, but overshadowed by Ripley’s attack on nonvoting stock.
199. See id. at 25–37. Ripley’s articles did deal with chartermongering as a regulatory problem.
200. See id. at 46–51.
201. See id. at 55–61.
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corporation finance at the Harvard Business School.202 Berle’s writings
in the 1920s examined the various ways that corporation law was changing to disempower shareholders. While his name does not appear in the
Atlantic articles, Berle’s name and ideas show up half-a-dozen times in
Main Street and Wall Street, usually in connection with the legal changes
Ripley is attacking.203 By 1927, they were such good friends that when
Ripley was injured on his way to give his speech to the ABA, Berle read
the paper in his stead.204 As discussed below, it was through Berle’s
friendship with Ripley that he secured a grant to begin his study of the
modern corporation.205
The interplay between Berle and Ripley also appears in a comparison of their work during the late 1920s.206 In Main Street and Wall
Street, Ripley repeated his criticisms of corporate governance and suggested solutions, but he also put forward a new proposal to mitigate the
problems of corporate governance. In the face of shareholder apathy and
powerlessness, Ripley suggested that permanent committees be formed
to represent shareholders’ interests and to serve as “independent checks
or balances” on traditional corporate management.207 A year later, when
Berle published his Studies in Corporation Finance, one of his main proposals for protecting shareholders was for trust companies to hold stock
on behalf of small shareholders and so garner a block of stock large
enough to “represent the depositors of the stock . . . and, as representing
their clients, [they] could take the action necessary to prevent or rectify
violations of property rights.”208 Both men were searching for an institutional intermediary that could defend small shareholders’ rights.
When Main Street and Wall Street appeared, its reception ranged
from positive to gushing and testified to how widely Ripley’s ideas had
spread. The distinguished corporate law scholar Henry Ballantine, writing in the California Law Review, was driven to poetry. Discussing Ripley’s impact on Wall Street, he wrote:
A look of sadness, a blush of shame,

202. See JORDAN SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A. BERLE AND THE VISION OF AN AMERICAN
ERA 51–52 (1987).
203. See RIPLEY, MAIN STREET, supra note 9, at 47, 53, 60, 92, 122, 131, 133.
204. See SCHWARZ, supra note 202, at 52.
205. See id. at 51.
206. For an extended comparison of their proposals, see Tsuk Mitchell, supra note 160, at
1529–33.
207. See RIPLEY, MAIN STREET, supra note 9, at 131–55.
208. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATE FINANCE 39 (1928) (quoted in
William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 737, 752
(2001)). As Bratton notes, Berle would move away from proposals to empower shareholders in the
1930s. See Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered, supra at 752.
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Over the faces of Wall Street came,
A spirit of manhood within them stirred,
To life at Ripley’s horrible words.209

Other reviews also alluded to both the impact and the popularity of
Ripley’s work, one writing that “no recent book dealing with economic
subjects has received so much attention,” 210 another making much the
same point, that “seldom, if ever, has the appearance of a book within the
general field of applied economics, created such a stir in the American
world of affairs. . . .”211 Yet this popularity did not detract from the
weight reviewers gave the book; another called it the “most important
book on the economic aspects of our day since . . . [Keynes’s] Economic
Consequences of the Peace.”212
In its review, The New York Times also sought to answer a puzzling
question: Why did a campaign waged by this “bespectacled” Harvard
economist gain so much attention? Ripley did have access to the pages
of the Atlantic, but that alone could not explain the controversy his articles generated. The Times credited Ripley’s success to his writing style
and moral stance. Although a distinguished scholar, Ripley’s criticisms
were couched in the vernacular, and his “flippancies and colloquialisms”
entertained readers. At the same time—and in the same voice—Ripley
managed to speak as a prophet: “he is first and last a moral crusader,
hammering at the iniquities of his generation.”213 Not the least, he “mentions names and dates—a round score of corporations come in for scathing denunciation.”214 The review nicely captures the attractions of Ripley’s vivid writing style and of the outrage that permeates his work. It
also suggests one reason why Ripley’s critique was later forgotten: pitched at a broad audience, it lacks the heft of a scholarly work that would
have dissected corporation law and finance.215
For many readers, Main Street and Wall Street must have recalled
the previous decades’ muckraking classics, but a few recognized that the
work also marked a turning-point in popular understandings of corporation law and governance. As noted above, while shareholder protection
209. Henry W. Ballantine, Ripley’s Indictment of Corporate Skulduggery, 17 CAL. L. REV. 35,
35 (1928).
210. E. A. Kincaid, Book Review, 14 VA. L. REV. 240, 241 (1927) (reviewing Main Street and
Wall Street).
211. Avard L. Bishop, Main Street and Wall Street, 37 YALE L.J. 280, 280 (1927).
212. Harold Lasswell, Book Review, 33 AM. J. SOC. 658, 659 (1928) (reviewing Main Street
and Wall Street).
213. Evans Clark, Cleaning House in Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1927, at BR1.
214. Id.
215. The one chapter in the book that seems most “scholarly” was drawn from Ripley’s work
as a railroad expert; it was a dry disquisition on railroad line consolidation between New York and
Chicago. See RIPLEY, MAIN STREET, supra note 9, at 255–75.
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has always been one element of corporation law, before the 1920s public
discourse over corporations had focused on the corporation’s relationship
to groups outside the corporation—customers, competitors, the general
public—summed up in the term “the trust problem.” In the 1920s, the
spotlight had begun to shift to the corporation’s relationship to its shareholders.216 Writing in the Nation, Stuart Chase took from Main Street
and Wall Street that “the fat boys, no longer content with their ancient
perquisite of milking the public, are now engaged in the dizzy and lofty
job of squeezing their own shareholders dry!”217 In the American Journal of Sociology the political scientist Harold Lasswell also highlighted
the shift:
[Main Street and Wall Street] is a study in the corporation problem,
which must be distinguished from the trust problem, about which so
much was formerly written and about which so little is heard today.
The welkin used to ring with complaints that big business gouged
the consumer, and that monopolistic prices were squeezing the life
out of the innocent public. In this post-war world big business has
somehow or other become a matter of course, and the controversies
over it are conducted from the standpoint of the participant, not the
outsider. It is the little investor and not the little buyer who squeals
for help.218

Main Street and Wall Street was a popular and critical success. It
drove home the modern problems of corporate governance—the separation of ownership and control, dispersed share ownership, and the dangers this posed for small shareholders—not only for a scholarly audience
but also for a broad swath of American readers.
D. Followers
Ripley’s accident and nervous breakdown took him off the public
stage for several years, yet the ideas he had propounded continued to be
heard. By the late 1920s it was almost a commonplace that ownership
and control of corporations had separated, and that problems created by
the separation were exacerbated by the dispersion of share ownership.219
216. See MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY 89 (1990) (explaining that in the
1920s the “relationship of a company’s stockholder owners to its management now became a matter
of substantial concern in a number of western nations”). Lawrence Mitchell has found a shift to
investor protection in securities acts proposed at the dawn of the 1920s. See MITCHELL,
SPECULATION ECONOMY, supra note 25, at 263–64.
217. Chase, supra note 70, at 264.
218. Lasswell, supra note 212, at 658.
219. See, e.g., JOHN H. SEARS, THE NEW PLACE OF THE STOCKHOLDER 35–43 (1929) (reproducing comments by many observers in a chapter entitled “The Era of the Small Stockholder”). By
1928, recognition of the separation of ownership and control even appeared in a Supreme Court
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In the years after Main Street and Wall Street, other authors would write
popular works on the American corporation and the small shareholder,
attempting to replicate Ripley’s popular success. None enjoyed his readership, but their work demonstrates that Ripley’s ideas continued in the
main current of American economics and culture.220
In 1929, John H. Sears’s The New Place of the Stockholder was described as another addition to the “long list of recent business books
brought out in response to a popular demand, which seemed to grow
along with public participation in the recent boom market.”221 Sears was
an attorney with the Corporation Trust Company, but his book was
aimed at a popular audience. It opened with a folksy “Prologue” in
which two stereotyped Irishmen discussed the modern corporation.222 In
this exchange, readers are told that, while problems in corporations exist,
they are rapidly learning to heed the voice of their shareholders, with one
speaker telling his friend that, “Me son tells me that invistors is getting’
informed of their rights” [sic].223 Sears was not a complete apologist for
the status quo; he acknowledged some problems caused by dispersed
shareholding and advocated increased voluntary disclosure by public
corporations, including an annual “lawyers’ audit” of its activities. But
the chief problem he identified was just that corporate management had
not done enough to make small shareholders feel welcomed by the corporation. His overall approach can be summed up by his statement that,
“I don’t think Main Street has any right to criticize Wall Street in matters
of corporate finance.”224
Frankenstein, Incorporated took the opposite tack. It was written
by a respected New York corporation lawyer and professor at Fordham
Law School, Maurice Wormser.225 As the title suggests, Wormser was a
sharper critic of the corporation than Ripley, but his book echoes Main
Street and Wall Street. The book locates many “glaring abuses” in the
“transformation of small, closely held, personal business corporadecision. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 114 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(“A standing criticism of the use of corporations in business is that it causes such business to be
owned by people who do not know anything about it. Argument has not been supposed to be necessary in order to show that the divorce between the power of control and knowledge is an evil.”).
220. As noted above, it also had its predecessors in Carver’s Economic Revolution and Brooking’s work. See supra text accompanying notes 99–100.
221. Robert L. Masson, Book Review, 5 THE ACCOUNTING REVIEW 324 (1930) (reviewing The
New Place of the Stockholder).
222. See Sears, supra note 219, at xiii. This was Sears’s attempt to emulate the ethnic humor
of Peter Finley Dunne’s popular “Mr. Dooley.”
223. Id.
224. Id. at 6.
225. See I. MAURICE WORMSER, FRANKENSTEIN, INCORPORATED (F.B. Rothman 1981)
(1931).
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tions . . . into nationwide companies whose stock is widely held in many
dispersed hands and which too often are characterized by loose, careless
management and control.”226 Many of his targets were also the same;
“chartermongering” states, nonvoting stock, and holding companies all
came in for criticism. However, the solutions he proposes are more ambitious than Ripley’s. In particular, Wormser advocated a uniform national corporation law. Fundamentally, though, Wormser followed Ripley in attacking the “tendency to corporate control by a small
group[,] . . . [which] has given rise to a reign of corporate oligarchy. . . .
The shareholders have become an empty cipher.”227
Both The New Place of the Stockholder and Frankenstein, Incorporated recalled Ripley’s work. Both focused on the separation of ownership and control and dispersed shareholding, and both spent time on the
legal mechanisms by which management could overpower shareholders.
But they, and indeed Main Street and Wall Street, would ultimately be
eclipsed by another successor, Berle and Means’s The Modern Corporation and Private Property.
IV. FROM MAIN STREET TO THE MODERN CORPORATION
After its publication in 1932, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property would set the agenda for corporation law for the rest of the century, establishing the separation of ownership and control as the central
issue of modern corporate governance. Its introduction, however, closed
with an acknowledgment that it was not the first work to tackle these issues: “all students of these and allied problems, and we among them,
owe a debt to Professor William Z. Ripley . . . who must be recognized
as having pioneered this area.”228 The Modern Corporation was no
knockoff of Main Street and Wall Street—indeed, as discussed below, its
departures from the 1920s critiques were as significant as its resemblance
to them—but the later book clearly followed in Ripley’s wake.
The Modern Corporation owed its origins to Ripley. In 1927, with
Ripley’s support, Berle received a grant from the Laura Spellman Rockefeller Foundation to begin a study of the modern corporation that would
eventually become The Modern Corporation and Private Property.229
When the foundation insisted that Berle collaborate with an economist in
the study, he chose an old friend, Gardiner Means. Means was by then a
graduate student in economics at Columbia, but he began his graduate
career at Harvard, where he had taken Ripley’s course on the corporation
226. Id. at 87.
227. Id. at 159.
228. BERLE & MEANS, MODERN CORPORATION, supra note 1, at ix.
229. SCHWARZ, supra note 202, at 51–52.
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and industry.230 Ripley’s support of Berle and of his project continued
over the next few years. When Berle’s casebook on Corporation Finance
appeared in 1931, Ripley reviewed it for the Columbia Law Review, describing it not only as a landmark contribution to jurisprudence and business practice but also as a companion to Main Street and Wall Street.231
In fact, another reviewer of the casebook described it as just “an able and
brilliant footnote” to Main Street and Wall Street.232
The Modern Corporation and Private Property appeared in late
1932. The story of its publication and success is fairly well-known. The
book was initially scheduled to be published by the Corporation Clearing
House, a law publisher and subsidiary of the Corporation Trust Company, but shortly after publication, a client of the Trust Company read a
review and demanded that the publisher pull the book.233 The book was
picked up by Macmillan, whose clout brought The Modern Corporation
“much wider distribution and review.”234 Glowing reviews helped it
along. In the New York Herald Tribune, the historian Charles Beard
called the work perhaps the most “significant work of American statecraft” since the Federalist Papers,235 while in the New Republic Stuart
Chase called it “epoch-shattering.”236 It sold well and was hailed as a
classic.237
In its outlines, the story of the work’s success is no doubt correct.
But that success is still puzzling. The Modern Corporation and Private
Property is not an easy book. As more than one critic has noted, it is a
work of parts that do not always hang together, with daunting statistical
sections and long disquisitions on arcane areas of corporation law sharing space with portentous speculations about the evolution of American
society and economics. “Except for corporate lawyers who happened to
have a way with statistics, few readers could have understood all of the
230. Frederic Lee, The Modern Corporation and Gardiner Means’s Critique of Neoclassical
Economics, 24 J. EC . I SSUES 673, 675 (1990).
231. William Z. Ripley, Book Review, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 1220, 1222 (1931) (reviewing
BERLE, CASES AND MATERIALS IN THE LAW OF CORPORATE FINANCE (1930)).
232. Joseph V. Kline, Book Review, 42 HARV. L. REV. 714 (1929).
233. See BERLE, NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, 1918–1971: FROM THE PAPERS OF ADOLF A.
BERLE, 21–22 (Beatrice Bishop Berle & Travis Beal Jacobs eds. 1973) [hereinafter NAVIGATING
THE RAPIDS].
234. McCraw, Berle and Means, supra note 34, at 581.
235. SCHWARZ, supra note 202, at 60 (quoting Charles A. Beard, Who Owns–and Who Runs–
the Corporations, NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE, Feb. 19, 1933, at § 10 (Books), 1).
236. Stuart Chase, Ticker Tapeworms, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 23, 1933, at 299. Berle mentioned the Beard and Chase reviews as especially significant in his memoirs. BERLE, NAVIGATING
THE RAPIDS, supra note 233, at 22.
237. Sales were good though perhaps not spectacular; over twenty years it sold 35,000 copies.
SCHWARZ, supra note 202, at 61. But by early 1934 it was in its seventh printing. See BERLE &
MEANS, MODERN CORPORATION, supra note 1, at Frontpiece.
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book.”238 Macmillan’s promotional reach alone cannot explain the
book’s success nor can its timing. The Modern Corporation was certainly not the only book published during the 1930s seeking to explain economic changes, and unlike some of its competitors, The Modern Corporation barely addressed the Great Depression.239
Why then was it so quickly and rapturously welcomed? Some credit must go to the work of Ripley and to other corporate critics of the
1920s. The Modern Corporation and Private Property had the welcome
quality of being, at least at first glance, a new variation on themes popularized by the earlier authors. Reviewer after reviewer noted that The
Modern Corporation fit into a familiar genre. A reviewer in the Cornell
Law Quarterly called The Modern Corporation a “further, more detailed,
and up-to-date study” of the problem examined by Ripley in Main Street
and Wall Street, while also mentioning earlier works by Veblen and John
Sears. 240 The Yale Law Journal described The Modern Corporation as
the latest in a “series of books [that] in recent years has discerned the
widening gap between the legal theory of the corporation and its use or
abuse in business practice,” a series that included Carver’s Present Economic Revolution and Wormser’s Frankenstein Incorporated, as well as
Main Street and Wall Street. 241 Other reviewers also noted the similarity
between Berle and Means’s and Ripley’s work, not the least being Ripley
himself, who wrote a generous review of The Modern Corporation in the
New York Times shortly before its publication. He stated that, while he
had “brushed over . . . lightly” the issues raised by their work in Main
Street and Wall Street, The Modern Corporation provided “a more substantial appraisal of . . . the whole business.”242
What was old and what was new in The Modern Corporation?
Many of its ideas and themes had been circulating for a decade, not only
in academic circles but also, thanks chiefly to Ripley’s work, in broader
public discourse. Readers had learned in magazines and books that ownership had separated from control in giant corporations, that this was ac238. McCraw, Berle and Means, supra note 34, at 581 (1990).
239. Bookstores in the early 1930s were crowded with books promising to diagnose and cure
the nation’s economic ills, with titles like The Crisis of Capitalism in America, From Chaos to Control, The Road to Recovery, and America Faces the Future. See Howard Odom, A New Deal Popular Bookshelf, 12 SOCIAL FORCES 601, 603 (1934).
240. Robert S. Stevens, Book Review, 18 CORNELL L.Q. 634, 634 (1933) (reviewing The Modern Corporation and Private Property). See also Paul L. Sayre, Book Review, 18 IOWA L. REV. 581,
584 (1932) (review of The Modern Corporation and Private Property) (stating that Berle and Means
“carr[y] on the work of Professor Ripley”).
241. Nathan Isaacs, Book Review, 42 YALE L.J. 463, 463 (1933) (reviewing The Modern Corporation and Private Property).
242. William Z. Ripley, Our ‘Corporate Revolution’ and Its Perils, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1932,
at XX1.
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celerated by the growth of small stockholders, and that these developments posed deep problems for the legitimacy and governance of the
modern corporation. They were familiar as well with a corporate critique
that focused not on the corporation’s threat to consumers, workers, competitors, or the general public, but on the threat that untrammeled management posed shareholders.243 They had even been introduced to the
notion that shares were a new kind of property.244 Were this the sum of
The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle and Means would
not have been saying much new; but, of course, it was not.
The Modern Corporation and Private Property was not only a
product of the 1920s critiques; it was also a transcendence of them.
Berle and Means began with the materials developed in the 1920s but
expanded upon them and fit them within an overarching framework absent from the earlier works. Main Street and Wall Street had been a
work of journalism and advocacy, more jeremiad than treatise. The
Modern Corporation had its advocacy, but it was, in addition, a commanding work of scholarship, partnering daunting empirical and statistical data with a dense discussion of recent developments in corporation
law. In both appearance and fact, The Modern Corporation had a weight
that Main Street and Wall Street lacked. Where Ripley and his epigones
had sketched out the growth of shareholding, Gardiner Means surveyed
major firms to provide fine-grained and systematic information about
small shareholdings at the nation’s largest corporations.245 Where Ripley
pointed to nonvoting stock as a culprit for management’s disconnect
from shareholders and in his book drew on Berle’s articles to sketch out
other pernicious legal developments, Berle spent almost one hundred
pages of The Modern Corporation providing a detailed synopsis of legal
changes that had over decades disempowered shareholders.246
Berle and Means also developed concepts absent from the 1920s
debates, perhaps a sign of the distance between 1927 and 1932. One of
these was the idea of “control” as a separate category from ownership
and management, an idea one careful critic has labeled a “profound and
original insight, perhaps the salient long-term contribution” of The Modern Corporation.247 For Berle and Means, control of a giant corporation
was the ability to name its directors—and, therefore, to set its course—
and it could be wielded by a majority shareholder, by minority share243. See BERLE & MEANS, MODERN CORPORATION, supra note 1, at 7–8.
244. By Ripley; see supra Part III.C.
245. BERLE & MEANS, MODERN CORPORATION, supra note 1, at 47–68.
246. See id. 127–220.
247. McCraw, Berle and Means, supra note 34, at 585; see also BERLE & MEANS, MODERN
CORPORATION, supra note 1, at 69–72 and passim. This idea was new, though it does resonate with
criticisms of “banker’s control” of corporations in the 1910s and 1920s.
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holders if ownership were sufficiently dispersed, or by management if
there were no powerful minority shareholders.248 Another innovation
was a product of Berle’s legal writings. Whereas during the 1920s Ripley, and indeed Berle, had looked to shareholders to develop their own
mechanisms to tame corporate managers, perhaps with a nudge from the
FTC, by the early 1930s, Berle had begun to demand judicial protection
for shareholders. Hence, Berle insisted in The Modern Corporation that
corporate managers’ powers are “powers in trust,” subject to judicial
oversight in the same manner as are trustees’ powers.249 No longer was a
shareholder’s protection to be found only within the corporation; it was
also to be found in the courtroom.
Berle and Means’s most striking innovation, however, was to
embed their story of the separation of ownership and control and dispersed ownership within a larger historical narrative. The Modern Corporation and Private Property came with its own teleology. Relying on
Means’s study of growing corporate concentration, they claimed to have
discerned a process whereby the nation’s largest corporations absorbed
more and more of America’s assets. This was not merely an observation
that corporations were getting larger. Within the corporate system, Berle
and Means asserted, there was a “centripetal attraction, which draws
wealth together into aggregations of constantly increasing size.”250 Already, as the authors showed, the two hundred largest U.S. nonbank corporations controlled half the nation’s corporate wealth, and if their
growth continued, as the authors expected it would, those two hundred
corporations would conduct seventy percent of all corporate activity by
mid-century.251
The continued growth of the modern corporation and its accrual of
economic and political power was for Berle and Means the central fact of
modern life, rendering the corporation an organization with an impact
comparable to the medieval church or the modern state.252 They agreed
with earlier writers who noted that the corporation had changed the nature of property, but they extrapolated from this the need not to reestab248. Though, in most cases, management held control. See BERLE & MEANS, MODERN
CORPORATION, supra note 1, at 128.
249. I take this point from William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s
Corporatist Origins, 34 J. Corp. L. 99, 107 (2008). Of course, this insistence made in the middle of
The Modern Corporation sits uneasily with the conclusions reached by the book’s final chapter.
250. BERLE & MEANS, MODERN CORPORATION, supra note 1, at 18. Others have disagreed
with this assessment. See, e.g., Symposium, Corporations and Private Property, 26 J.L. & ECON.
235.
251. BERLE & MEANS, MODERN CORPORATION, supra note 1, 32, 40.
252. Id. at 352. Berle and Means were careful, though, not simply to equate the three; they
wrote of the corporation’s “concentration of power in the economic field comparable to the concentration of religious power in the medieval church or of political power in the national state.” Id.
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lish shareholder power over the corporation but to rethink “the ends for
which the modern corporation can or will be run.”253 The corporate critiques of the 1920s tended to close with a call to tame corporate management. The Modern Corporation closed with a more prophetic vision—one of the end of private enterprise, the abandonment of the profit
motive, and the transformation of corporate control from a selfish clique
into a “purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the community and assigning to each a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy rather than private cupidity.”254
In sum, two elements decisively set The Modern Corporation and
Private Property apart from its predecessors. First was the weight and
thoroughness of its scholarly apparatus. Whereas earlier authors identified the separation of ownership and control and dispersed shareholding
as creating deep problems of corporate governance, Berle and Means
documented both phenomena in a way never attempted previously.
Second, they bound up their conclusions in a grand narrative, one which
portrayed the split of ownership and control and the spread of shareholding not as ordinary problems to be solved but as elements of a fundamental transformation of American society and of capitalism itself. 255
CONCLUSION
Scholars and historians date the origins of modern corporate governance to the 1932 publication of Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner Means’s The
Modern Corporation and Private Property. This Article argues that
conclusion is wrong. Well before the publication of The Modern Corporation the separation of ownership and control, dispersed shareholding
and the problems attendant on them were topics of intellectual analysis
and, more surprising, public debate. The intellectual roots of these ideas
stretch back at least to the 1890s, and authors including Louis Brandeis,
Walter Lippmann, and Thorsten Veblen grappled with them before
World War I. In the 1920s, the separation of ownership and control and
consequent questions of corporate governance became matters for public
debate, thanks largely to the work of Harvard economist William Z. Ripley, who popularized them in a public crusade against corporate man253. Id. at 7–8.
254. Id. at 356. This echoes Lippmann’s vision in Drift and Mastery, see supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
255. Dalia Tsuk has reached a similar conclusion, writing that The Modern Corporation and
Private Property’s novelty was not its “rigorous analysis of the separation of ownership from control . . . [but] its normative message.” Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism: Berle and
Means and 20th Century American Legal Thought, 30 LAW & S OC . I NQUIRY 175, 186–87 (2005).
Her work also emphasizes the influence American legal realists had on Berle and Means, a topic
beyond the scope of this paper.
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agement that culminated in his 1927 work Main Street and Wall Street.
Due to Ripley and others, by the 1920s the orientation of corporation law
was already shifting from concern over corporations’ power over outsiders such as consumers and competitors, to worries about the distribution
of power within the corporation, as shareholder protection became a central concern for corporate law and theory.
This conclusion does not denigrate from The Modern Corporation
and Private Property’s real achievements; instead, it helps better explain
them. The Modern Corporation and Private Property was quickly hailed
as a classic due to the fact that it was both startling and familiar. Its
grand prophecies about the transformation of capitalism were startling,
yet those prophecies rested on conclusions about corporate evolution and
governance that had been spread widely in the decades before its publication. It was because The Modern Corporation was a continuation of
trends in American thought, the latest in a series of works on the separation of ownership and control, dispersed shareholding, and corporate governance, that its more radical conclusions won a hearing. Only with the
passage of time and with the fading of memories of William Z. Ripley
and other writers, did Berle and Means come to be seen as the discoverers of the separation of ownership and control and The Modern Corporation as the originating document of modern corporate governance.

